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I.  Introduction
On September 11, 2001, nineteen men hijacked four planes, crashing one each 
into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and in Shanksville, 
Pennsylvania.1  Approximately three-thousand people from eighty-seven countries were 
killed.2 That evening President Bush addressed the nation, stating that the full resources 
of the intelligence and law enforcement communities would be devoted to finding those 
responsible for the attacks.3  The President further stated that, “We will make no 
distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them.”4
On September 20, the President addressed a joint session of Congress, declaring that “On 
September the 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country.”5
The war against terrorism was soon in full swing.
Terrorism is of course not a new problem.  Many have noted that history is replete 
with instances of groups using violence to achieve political objectives.6  Modern 
terrorism, with its emphasis on “liberty and self-determination” can be traced to the 
Britain’s Glorious Revolution, and the use of violence for symbolic purposes was later 
1 N. R. Kleinfield, U.S. Attacked: Hijacked Jets Destroy Twin Towers and Hit Pentagon In Day Of Terror, 
N.Y. TIMES, September 12, 2001, at A1
2
 Ruth Wedgwood, Al Qaeda, Terrorism and Military Commissions, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 328, 328 (2002).
3 Statement of President George W. Bush, dated September 11, 2001.
4 Id.
5
 Statement of President George W. Bush dated September 20, 2001.
6 See, e.g., Ramsey Kleff, Terrorism: The Trinity Perspective, in TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE: 
THE LIMITS AND POSSIBILITIES OF LEGAL CONTROL 15 (1993 Henry. H. Han ed., 1993) (noting evidence of 
terrorism by the Israelites in the Old Testament.).
legitimated by the French Revolution.7 Others have noted that terrorism was an effective 
tool of national liberation movements after the Second World War.8 During the 1970s 
and 1980s, the frequency of terrorist attacks substantially increased.  The U.S. 
Department of State, for example, recorded 13,572 incidents of international terrorism 
between 1968 and 1991.9  In 2002, the State Department recorded 199 incidents of 
international terrorism.10 Furthermore, there is good reason to believe that terrorist 
activity will persist in coming years.  Yonah Alexander, for example, notes that terrorism 
will increase because 1) it has been successful in attracting publicity, 2) resources such as 
weapons, financing, and communication are readily available, and 3) an international 
network of groups and states supporting terrorism already exists.11  More importantly, 
many of the underlying causes of terrorism, including the ideological roots of terrorist
movements, remain.12
Given these trends, it is clear that all governments need a comprehensive strategy 
for effectively combating the terrorism.  This paper takes a comparative approach to 
studying strategies implemented by various countries to combat terrorism .  I first 
examine what we mean by “terrorism.”  Next, I will examine three models for dealing 
with terrorism: the “criminal justice” model, the “intelligence” model, and the “war” 
model. Next, I will examine the counterterrorism approaches employed by the United 
7 Id. at 16.
8 See PAUL WILKINSON, TERRORISM VERSUS DEMOCRACY: THE LIBERAL STATE RESPONSE 21 (2000).
9
 A.J. Jongman, Trends in Terrorism, 1968-1988, in WESTERN RESPONSES TO TERRORISM 34 (Alex Schmid  
& Ronald D. Crelinstein eds. 1993).
10 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 2002 Patterns of Global Terrorism 1.  The State Department notes that this 
is a 44% decline from the 355 attacks in 2001, and the number of deaths from attacks decreased from 3,295 
to 725.  Id.  However, the 2001 number includes the deaths resulting from the September 11 attacks.  The 
vast majority incidents of international terrorism in 2002 occurred in the Middle East and Asia.  No attacks 
were recorded in North America.  Id. at xviii.  Of course, the State Department’s report does not include the
large numbers of acts of purely “domestic” terrorism.  See Wilkinson, supra note 8, at 45.
11 YONAH ALEXANDER, COMBATING TERRORISM 7 (2002).
12 See id.
States, Israel, and India.  Using a functional approach, I will attempt to place each 
country’s counterterrorist policy within one of the three models discussed. Particular 
attention will be paid to the civil liberties implications of counterterrorist  policies in each 
country.  Specifically, I argue each country has adopted a war-model of counterterrorism , 
and except in the case of India, has increased its application since the September 11 
attacks.  The “war on terror” terminology is more than just a rhetorical device.  Rather, it 
reflects a new model for U.S. and other countries’ counterterrorism policies – policies
which have increasingly encroached on the civil liberties and human rights, while at the 
same time ignoring the underlying causes of terrorism and therefore exacerbating the 
terrorist threat.
II.  Theoretical Framework
A.  Defining the Problem
Terrorism is not simply the act of madmen.  It is “a calculated move in a political 
game.”13  Actors engage in terrorism with objectives in mind.  Moreover, terrorism is an 
important means for non-state actors who lack resources to achieve these objectives.14
Violence is perceived to advance objectives, most typically by inciting fear and bringing 
attention to the terrorist’s cause, and by increasing the bargaining power of groups 
engaged in terrorism.15  Terrorism, therefore, is not merely an act of violence, it is 
“propaganda by deed.”16
13 PHILLIP HEYMANN, TERRORISM AND AMERICA: A COMMON SENSE STRATEGY FOR A DEMOCRATIC 
SOCIETY xix (1998). 
14 RICHARD J. CHASDI, TAPESTRY OF TERROR: A PORTRAIT OF MIDDLE EASTERN TERRORISM, 1994-1999 3 
(2002).
15 See ALAN DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS 79 (2002).
16
 L. Paul Bremer III, The West’s Counterterrorist Strategy, in WESTERN RESPONSES TO TERRORISM 256 
(Alex P. Schmid & Ronald D.  Crelinstein eds., 1993)
Beyond these observations, however, defining “terrorism” is problematic.  First, 
terrorism is not a monolithic concept.17  Wilkinson, for example, notes that a typology of 
terrorism would include distinctions between “state” and “factional” terrorism, 
international and domestic terrorism, and distinctions based on politics.18  Ideological 
underpinnings may include nationalism (as in the case of the Irish Republican Army),
ideological (Germany’s Red Army Faction), religio-political terrorists (Hamas in the 
Middle East) and single issue terrorists (such as anti-abortion groups).19
Second, the term terrorism has a significant negative connotation.  To call 
something terrorism is to condemn it.20  As a result, many have noted that the terms 
“terrorist” and “terrorism” have become so overused that they have lost much of their 
significance.21 At the same time, this continuous expansion of the definition of the word 
exaggerates the threat posed by terrorism and influences public reaction, and therefore 
government policy.22 For example, some have noted that compared to traffic accidents, 
drug crimes, or domestic violence, terrorism is a minor problem.  Yet a large amount of 
resources is devoted to the terrorist threat.23  As result, terrorists have disproportionate 
power over policy relative to their threat.24 More importantly, the implicit condemnation 
of the word “terrorism” ignores the accurate if cliché observation that, “one man’s 
terrorist is another man’s freedom-fighter.”25 The German occupying force during the 
17
 Thomas H. Mitchell, Defining the Problem, DEMOCRATIC RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 13 
(David A. Charters ed., 1991)
18
 Wilkinson, supra note 8, at 19.  
19 Id. at 19-20.
20
 Mitchell, supra note 17, at 13.  
21 See, e.g., Kleff, supra note 6, at 17.
22
 Grant Wardlaw, The Democratic Framework, THE DEADLY SIN OF TERRORISM 6 (David A. Charters ed., 
1994).
23 See Jongman, supra note 9, at 26.  
24 PHILLIP HEYMANN, TERRORISM, FREEDOM AND SECURITY: WINNING WITHOUT WAR 4 (2003).
25
 Mitchell, supra note 17, at 9
Second World War, for example, referred to the Dutch resistance as “terrorists.”26   In 
1948, several prominent American clergyman condemned Menachem Begin for leading 
“a terroristic band.”  Begin, repeatedly asserted, however, that members of his 
organization were “freedom fighters” rather than terrorists.27 The opposite problem 
afflicted Democratic Presidential Candidate Howard Dean in September 2003.  During an 
interview, he was asked about his feelings about Israel’s assassination of Hamas 
militants.  Governor Dean responded by saying that the militants were soldiers making 
war and casualties would naturally result.  Other Democratic candidates, such as Senator 
John Kerry of Massachusetts, immediately criticized Governor Dean, arguing that Hamas 
militants were “terrorists” not “soldiers.”28
Statutory definitions have tended to ignore this terrorist/freedom-fighter 
ambiguity.  The U.S. defines terrorism as “violent acts” or acts “dangerous to human life” 
that appear to be intended to i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to 
influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the 
conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination or kidnapping.29  Similarly, 
the British Prevention of Terrorism Act of 1974 defined terrorism as “the use of violence 
for political ends, and includes any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public 
or any section of the public in fear.”30  Such definitions are unsatisfying because they are 
the creation of policymakers, for whom acts that constitutes “terrorism” are often self-
26
 Alex P. Schmid, The Response Problem, in WESTERN RESPONSES TO TERRORISM 11 (edited by Alex P. 
Schmid & Ronald D. Crelinstein eds., 1993).
27 ROBERT KUMAMOTO, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1945-1976 12 
(1999).
28 See Rachel L. Swarns, Gephardt Attacks Dean on 2 Social Programs, N.Y. TIMES, September 13, 2003 
at A9.  The irony was pointed out by Governor Dean himself, who noted that his statement was meant to 
justify the assassinations.  
29 Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act of 1992 § 2331, 18 U.S.C. §2331 (2000).
30
 Heymann, supra note 13, at 3.
evident.31  In addition, in marginal cases, the ability of executive officials to use 
discretion in the enforcement of statutory provisions, allows legislators to be over-
inclusive in their definitions of terrorism.  As such, statutory definitions are not useful
frameworks for understanding terrorism, and may also be poor mechanisms for 
understanding a country’s counterterrorist policy.
In contrast, moral ambiguities considerably curtail the ability of academics to 
settle on a single definition of terrorism.  In 1988, Schmid and Jongman reported 109 
different definitions currently in use among leading academics.32  Eventually, and based 
on comments from the academic community, Schmid put forth his own definition:
Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by 
(semi-)clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or 
political reasons, whereby – in contrast to assassination – the direct targets of the 
violence are not the main targets.  The immediate human victims of violence are 
generally chosen at randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively 
(representativeor symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message 
generators.  Threat – and violence-based communication processes between 
terrorist (organization), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to 
manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target 
of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, 
or propaganda is primarily sought.33
While Schmid’s definition is comprehensive, the definition of terrorism I will 
employ will differ in several ways.  First, while States may engage in terrorism, I will 
only be concerned with terrorism committed by sub-state actors.  State terrorism will 
typically involve conduct by a state against its own citizens, as was the case in the Soviet 
Union under Stalin.34  In such situations, a state’s “counterterrorist” policy is irrelevant.  
31 See Mitchell, supra note 17, at 12.
32 Id. at 15.
33
 Schmid, supra note 26, at 8.  However, Schmid acknowledges that his definition is too lengthy for 
policymakers. Id.  Eventually, Schmid asserts a legal definition of terrorism as the peace-time equivalent of 
war-crimes (in other words, activities, which if committed during war time, would be considered war-
crimes).
34 See, e.g, Kleff, supra note 6 at 17-18.
In situations where a state engages in direct acts of violence against citizens of another 
State, such acts would constitute acts of war.  The models of counterterrorist policy that
are the focus of this paper are irrelevant in both situations. 35
Second, terrorism in this paper will only refer to activities which have the purpose 
of effectuating political change.  Idiosyncratic or purely “criminal” terrorism, for 
example when organized crime actors use violence to prevent prosecution, can most 
likely be dealt with through standard law enforcement techniques because such terrorists 
will typically not have the resources of State sponsorship or popular support that would 
require a state to choose between the models discussed in this paper.  In short, 
idiosyncratic, criminal, and state terrorism, do not present the interesting dilemmas for 
democratic states that political sub-state terrorism does.
Finally, Schmid’s definition does not address the moral ambiguities of terrorism.  
As mentioned earlier, policymakers perhaps do not need to concern themselves if their 
definitions are over-inclusive because political forces will dictate when they decide to 
employ their counterterrorist policies.  However, employing counterterrorist policy based 
on political preferences may lead to accusations of hypocrisy.  An over-inclusive 
definition may also allow a government to use a terrorism statute to prosecute those who 
legislators never intended to come under the statute (for example, if the USA Patriot Act 
was used to investigate animal rights groups).  It may even be argued that such an 
approach is antithetical to the rule of law.  
35
 State terrorism, here, is distinguished from state-sponsored terrorism.  State-sponsored terrorism refers to 
terrorism by sub-state groups which are supported by States.  Unlike state terrorism, state sponsored 
terrorism does raise interesting questions of which models of counterterrorist policy a State should apply, 
and therefore is important to this analysis.
The opposite approach is to simply condemn all terrorism.  This approach is 
advocated by Benjamin Netanyahu, who argues that “nothing justifies terrorism…it is 
evil per se.”36  But such an approach is equally unsatisfactory because it does not take 
into account the complexity of many of the world’s conflicts.  Where is the line between 
terrorism and self-defense?  Moreover, many of those who would condemn all terrorism, 
would agree that violence by States is often necessary.  To argue that members of group 
may not resort to violence simply because they do not have a State, smacks of circularity 
– often groups resort to terror because they do not have their own State.  A workable 
definition of terrorism therefore requires sufficient flexibility to take into account the 
moral ambiguity of terrorism, while not having so much flexibility so as to collapse into 
the quagmire of deconstructionist nihilism.  
Taking into account the idea that terrorism is the result of political 
marginalization, I would therefore propose the following solution to the terrorist-
freedom-fighter dilemma:  violence against a state constitutes “terrorism” when that State 
is a well-working democracy.  In a well-working democracy, groups would have 
mechanisms to achieve political change without resorting to violence.  Under this 
definition, many groups which have been regarded as both “terrorists” and “freedom-
fighters”, such as the African National Congress, would no longer be considered terrorists 
because they were incapable of achieving their objectives through political processes.  In 
contrast, group which resorts to political violence when, as objective matter, alternatives 
are available, deserve the condemnation of the term “terrorist.”37
36 Heymann, supra note 13, at 4.
37 See also id.  at 9 (noting that defining terrorism as “violent domestic politics” directed at democratic 
regimes  retains “moral clarity” for the definition).
Many ambiguities are avoided under this definition because the merits of 
terrorists’ claims are not at issue.  Instead, moral ambiguities are collapsed into questions
of whether a set objectively verifiable procedural conditions generally viewed as essential 
to democracy (e.g. free speech and press, secret ballots, multi-party elections, rule of law, 
etc.) were met.  Political responsiveness is also something that is already measured by 
political scientists, albeit imperfectly. In addition, while there is not complete agreement 
on what is a “democracy”, there is substantially more agreement on this than on what the 
difference between terrorists and freedom-fighters are.
The definition of terrorism for the purposes paper will therefore be: the use of 
violence, or threat of violence, by sub-state actors, with or without the support of some 
State actor, against a democratic State38, which has the purpose of achieving political 
change by instilling fear in the public or government of the target state.
B.  Democracies and Terrorism
As a theoretical matter, stopping terrorism ought not to be difficult.  Phillip
Heymann notes that to execute an act of terrorism, the terrorist needs a set of definable 
things, such as access to the target, resources, and popular support.39  Prevention of 
terrorism merely requires denying the terrorist one of these conditions.40  Given that the 
problem and solution are definable, the problem facing governments today is not 
preventing terrorism per se, it is preventing terrorism within a democratic framework.41
38
 I do not mean to imply that citizens of an autocratic state who are victims of political violence do not fear 
or suffer.  One suffers equally as the victim of violence regardless of whether that act was an act of 
“terrorism.”  
39
 Heymann, supra note 13, at 84.
40 Id.  See also, Heymann, supra note 24 at 40 (2003).
41
 Heymann supra note 24, at 159.
There are several reasons why democracies will be particularly vulnerable to 
terrorist attacks.  First, democracies generally offer a wide degree of freedom of 
movement, both within a country and across borders.42  This allows access to targets,43 a 
means of escape, and the ability to seek shelter in foreign countries.44   Second, free 
speech rights allow organizations to criticize leaders and institutions to gain popular 
support,45 facilitating access to resources and recruits.  This problem is exacerbated by 
free association rights in democracies.46 Third, the constraints of democratic legal 
systems, with their emphasis on rights for the accused, may make it difficult to 
investigate and prosecute terrorists.47  Finally, in addition to allowing the discussion of 
ideas, the free press which is necessary to democracies allows for the uncontrolled 
dissemination of information about a terrorist attack.  A free media in a democracy 
therefore facilitates the very attention that terrorist organizations seek.
Exacerbating this vulnerability is the fact that political pressures in democracies 
can affect the way democracies respond to terrorist incidents. Heymann, for example, 
suggests that responses to terrorism can analyzed based on three criteria:  effectiveness, 
infringement of civil liberties, and political expediency.48 A significant danger exists 
when policies infringe on civil liberties and are also politically expedient (more so if the 
policy is also ineffective).  The biggest threat posed by terrorism may therefore be that 
42
 Schmid, supra note 26, at 18.
43 Id. at 19.
44 See Heymann, supra note 13 at 19.
45
 Wilkinson, supra note 8, at 23.
46
 Schmid, supra note 26, at 18.
47 Id. at 19.  
48
 Heymann, supra note 24, at 88.
the “interplay between terrorism, public reaction, and governmental response…may 
severely undermine the nation’s democratic traditions.”49
Several authors have engaged in comparative studies of how different countries
have responded to terrorism. Christopher Hewitt (1984) approaches his comparative 
analysis as an objective empiricist, with the purpose of determining which policies have 
been most effective against urban terrorism.50  Five cases are selected for his study: the 
IRA in Northern Ireland (1970-81), ETA in Spain (1975-81), the Red Brigades/Frontline 
in Italy (1977-81), the Tupamaros in Uruguay (1968-73) and EOKA in Cyprus (1955-58).  
Using time-series analysis, Hewitt examines the effectiveness of six counterterrorist
policies: (1) ceasefires and negotiations with terrorists, (2) improving economic 
conditions, (3) making reforms, (4) collective punishments, (5) emergency powers and 
other anti-terrorist legislation, and (6) the use of security forces.51
In assessing ceasefires and negotiations, Hewitt concludes that ceasefires result in 
a significant decline in violence.  However, negotiations are unlikely to result in conflict 
resolution because terrorist demands are often radical and inflexible.  As result, Hewitt 
concludes that negotiating truces with terrorist organizations is a “short-sighted” policy 
that, if the truce is extended, will benefit terrorists by giving them the opportunity to 
rebuild strength.52
In assessing the efficacy of improving economic conditions, Hewitt notes that 
there is considerable evidence to suggest a connection between poverty and violence.  
49 See Heymann, supra note 13 at 2.
50 CHRISTOPHER HEWITT, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ANTI-TERRORIST POLICIES xi. (1984).
51 Id. at 35
52 Id. at 36-41.
Economic conditions were a significant cause of violence in three of five cases studied.53
Measuring the effect of specific government policies to improve economic conditions is 
difficult because only in Northern Ireland was any affirmative attempt to improve 
conditions made, and because it is always difficult to tie specific governmental policies to 
economic effects.  But Hewitt does compare general economic conditions to violence 
rates.  Counter-intuitively, his results show that there is no significant link between poor 
economic conditions and terrorism, and terrorist activity may in fact be higher during 
good economic times.  Hewitt therefore concludes that general improvements in 
economic conditions should not be expected to decrease rates of terrorism.  However, 
Hewitt does argue that improving conditions before terrorist campaigns begin may 
prevent violence before it starts, and that improving the condition of specific groups may 
help reduce violence.54
In assessing the effect of reforms on terrorism, Hewitt notes that if terrorism is the 
result of grievances, addressing those grievances should reduce violence.  However, 
measuring the effect of reforms may be difficult because often reforms occur in phases.  
Hewitt therefore breaks down “reforms” into two phases: (1) ending the old regime, and 
(2) establishing new institutions.  Based on this analysis, Hewitt concludes that 
concessions made by governments “from a position of weakness” will likely increase 
violence in the short term during the creation of new institutions.  It is only after several 
years that violence rates will begin to decline.55
53
 Northern Ireland, Italy, and Uruguay.  Hewitt argues that economic conditions were not depressed in 
either Cyprus or Spain, and notes that Basque (home to the ETA) was one of richest regions of the latter.
54 HEWITT, supra note 50, at 43-47.
55 Id at 47-54.
Collective punishments were only undertaken in one of the cases in Hewitt’s 
study (Cyprus), and even there, they were used sparingly.  The effect of collective 
punishments is complicated because the level of generality upon which the punishment is 
based may affect the deterrent effect of the punishment.  Punishing a large area assumes a 
equal distribution of terrorists within that area (which was untrue in the case of Cyprus).  
Punishing a smaller area will reduce terrorism from that area, but may simply shift it to 
other areas.  Taking these considerations into account, however, Hewitt concludes that 
collective punishments do result in a generalized decline in terrorist activity.56  But this 
decline was a mere 1.7%.57 Collective punishments are a significant aspect of this study, 
and it is important to note that even if this decline were applicable to other situations, the 
small size of the decline calls into question the benefits of collective punishment as 
compared to the human rights implications.   In addition, the effect of collective 
punishments declines with each success punishment.58
Emergency or anti-terrorist legislation was undertaken in each case in Hewitt’s 
study.  Six types of legislation are examined in his study: (1) firearms control, (2) 
requiring the population to carry identity cards, (3) increasing investigatory powers of 
security forces (allowing searches of homes, arresting people without charge), (4) the 
establishment of special courts and procedures, (5) draconian penalties for terrorist 
offences, (6) the restriction of political rights such as free speech or assembly.  Hewitt 
concludes that such legislation has no discernable impact on violence.  However, he does 
concede the impact may be difficult to ascertain, most importantly because while 
56 Id at 55-60. 
57 Id at 59.
58 Id.
legislation may grant certain powers, the use of these powers by the executive will 
determine their effect.59
Finally, Hewitt studies two ways in which the use of security forces may decrease 
terrorism.  First, military forces may engage in patrols, mass searches, and 
counterinsurgency tactics.60  These tactics lead to no decline in violence rates.  They are 
in fact highly correlated with increases in violence, though Hewitt argues that this may be 
because an increase in violence causes increased patrols, rather than the reverse.61  The 
second tactic that security forces may take is to arrest terror suspects.  Hewitt finds a 
significant relationship between arrests and decreases in violence.62
Like Hewitt, Crelinstein and Schmid engage in cross-national study of 
counterterrorist policies.  Their study compares counterterrorist policies in 8 European 
countries:  the Netherlands, Spain, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, 
Switzerland, and Australia.  Crelinstein and Schmid’s study differs from Hewitt’s in two 
ways.  First, Crelinstein and Schmid do not attempt empirical assessment of each 
country’s approach, instead relying on descriptions and qualitative assessments of experts 
from each country.  In addition, Crelinstein and Schmid are concerned with analyzing 
counterterrorist policies through the lens of both effectiveness and democratic 
acceptability.63
Crelinstein and Schmid ultimately do not create a set of “best practices,” but 
rather discern a set of trends it counterterrorist policies.  They first place counterterrorist
policies into two categories: conciliatory, meaning either negotiation, or reform; and 
59 Id. at 61-67.
60 Id. at 82-84.
61 Id. at 86.
62 Id.
63 RONALD D. CRELINSTEIN & ALEX P. SCHMID, WESTERN RESPONSES TO TERRORISM 3 (1993).
repressive (criminal justice and military).64  Other axes of classification discussed by 
Crelinstein and Schmid are short-term versus long term responses, the proactiveness of 
responses, and whether the action deals with the coercive (i.e. violent) capabilities or 
political capabilities (i.e. ability to gain attention and support) of terrorists.65 Finally, 
Crelinstein and Schmid differentiate between “domestic” and “international” responses to 
terrorism.66
By comparing counterterrorist policies of different countries, Crelinstein and 
Schmid discern several trends.  First, the authors observe that while counterterrorist
policies in the 1970s emphasized the use of criminal justice (“legal-repressive”) 
mechanisms and international legal instruments, there has been a modern trend towards 
the use of the military because of weaknesses in the criminal justice model.67  This trend 
is best demonstrated by the Reagan administration during the 1980, which culminated in 
the bombing of Tripoli in April 1986.68
Second, in comparing the criminal justice and war models through the lens of 
democratic acceptability, Crelinstein and Schmid note that, counterintuitively, it is 
through the criminal justice model that Western countries have shifted away from 
democratic acceptability.69  This is due to common measures adopted in the criminal 
justice model, including special legislation, the creation of special courts, rules of 
evidence or procedure, and increased police powers.  One particularly common power is 
a prolonged ability to detain suspects without charge and without access to counsel.  In 
64 Id. at 309.
65 Id. at 310.
66 Id at 312.
67 Id at 333.
68 Id at 315-16.
69 Id at 334.
addition, it is in the domestic response to terrorism that the movement away from 
democratic principles has been most evident.70
Finally, Crelinstein and Schmid suggest two changes to counterterrorist policy.  
First, they suggest the adoption of a definition of terrorism as the “peacetime equivalent 
of war crimes.”71 Schmid argues that while such a definition would be under-inclusive, it 
is more likely to achieve consensus because there is a consensus on the definition of war 
crimes.72  Moreover, such a definition would reflect the criminality of terrorism while 
acknowledging its political dimension.73  Second, Crelinstein and Schmid suggest 
increased emphasis on addressing the political capabilities of terrorist groups rather then 
simply their violent activities.  In practical terms, this means more emphasis on 
delegitimation of terrorists as opposed to a singular focus on preventing terrorist acts.  
Crelinstein and Schmid argue that such methods may enable governments to find new 
ways of addressing terrorism which are more compatible with a democratic framework.74
Charters (1994) examines counterterrorist policies in six countries: the United 
Kingdom, Germany, Italy, France, Israel, and the United States.  Like Crelinstein and 
Schmid, Charters engages in a comparative study of counterterrorist policies using 
assessments from authors from each country examined.  However, rather than discerning 
trends in policies like Crelinstein and Schmid, Charters’ tends to focus predominantly on 
the civil liberties implications of counterterrorist policies.
Charters first observes that while terrorism is not by itself a threat to democracy, 
it does pose several threats to the democratic systems.  Most importantly, Charters notes 
70 Id at 335.
71 Id at 336.
72
 Schmid supra note 26, at 11-12.
73 Crelenstein & Schmid, supra note 63, at 336.
74 Id. at 337.
that in most countries, terrorist activity was met with public desire and government 
acquiescence in harsher counterterrorist policies that undermine democratic values.75
The threat of domestic terrorism was a particularly strong inducement to such policies.  
Only in the United States, for example, were severe measures favored for use outside the 
country, presumably because the threat to the U.S. remained overseas for the most part.76
Next, Charters measures the effectiveness of several a counterterrorist tactics 
relevant to his study.  First, he notes that negotiation was generally an ineffective strategy 
because terrorist generally regarded deals as temporary ploys, not permanent prohibitions 
on the use of force.77   Second, Charters notes that every country introduced some form of 
target hardening (decreasing access to targets) as counterterrorist tactic, but it was 
generally introduced as a reaction to attack rather than as a proactive measure.78  Charters 
argues that target-hardening may have some deterrent effect, but its real value may lie on 
its psychological benefits.  Most importantly, however, target hardening demonstrates a 
important point: democratic societies cannot both provide total security and maintain the 
openness requisite to democracy.79  Third, Charters argues that although military reprisals
lead to some attrition in terrorist ranks, it was generally an ineffective deterrent to 
terrorist activity, often leading to increased hostility.80  As result, Charters argues that the 
role of the military should be limited to hostage rescue operations which are morally 
defensible, defined, and can be conducted within a constitutional framework.81
75 DAVID A. CHARTERS, THE DEADLY SIN OF TERRORISM 212-13 (1994).
76 See id at 213.  Most laws passed by Congress, for example, dealt with federal authority overseas.  Id.
77 Id at 215.
78 Id at 218.
79 Id at 219.
80 Id at 219-220.
81 Id at 220.
As for the civil liberties implications of counterterrorist policies, Charters argues
that there was no “wholesale rush to restrict freedoms” despite rhetoric about the need to 
“stamp out terrorism.”82 Charters does note several infringements common to 
counterterrorist measures, including: expanded search and arrest powers, increased 
periods of detention, proscription of terrorist organizations and expanded deportation of 
powers.  However, given the apparent resilience of democracies in the face of terrorism, 
and the success in countering terrorist attacks, Charters argues that effectiveness and 
liberty are compatible (though, as noted earlier, total eradication is impossible while 
maintaining democratic openness).83  Charters, like Heymann, concludes that the greatest 
threat comes from public reaction to the threat, not the threat itself.  Fear reduction 
measures (such as crisis management) may therefore be some of the most important 
counterterrorist measures a government should take.84
Finally Yonah Alexander (2002) compares counterterrorist policy in ten 
countries: the U.S., Argentina, Peru, Colombia, Spain, the U.K., Israel, Turkey, India, 
and Japan.  Like prior studies, Alexander relies on assessments of policymakers in each 
country, with the specific intention of offering a “comprehensive ‘best practices’ 
strategy.”85  However, Alexander’s study is unique in that the individual assessments, and 
his findings are informed by the September 11 attacks.
Alexander divides his conclusions into two areas.  First, Alexander argues that the 
political and legal dynamic, reflecting the government policies vis-à-vis terrorism is 
crucial to explaining the success or failure of policies.  He argues that positive political 
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environment is critical to a successful counterterrorist policy.86  For example, Peru was 
successful in its counterterrorist campaign because the military did not substantially 
interfere with the lives of the people, and in fact forged constructive ties with them.87
Alexander also argues that Turkey’s changing of its criminal procedure laws to comport 
with international human rights norms aided its counterterrorist policy.
Second, Alexander notes several “best practices” which aid counterterrorist
policy.  Alexander first notes the importance of intelligence to operational success in 
counterterrorism.  Next, Alexander argues for a limited military role in counterterrorist
policy, and like Charters, cites hostage rescue as the archetypal military role in 
counterterrorism.88  Finally, citing success in Northern Ireland, but failure in the Spanish 
and Israeli cases, Alexander cites “mixed results” for negotiation with terrorist groups.89
C.  Models of Counterterrorist Policy
As noted earlier, Crelinstein and Schmid, in describing “repressive” models of 
counterterrorist policy, distinguish between the “criminal justice” and “war” models.90
Repressive models stand in contrast to “conciliatory” models, which seek to prevent 
terrorism either through negotiation or reform.  Conciliatory models change the rational
calculation of terrorism by addressing grievances. They prevent violence by reducing the
benefits, thereby altering the calculus of the terrorists’ cost-benefit analysis.  In contrast, 
repressive models seek to prevent violence by either punishing terrorists for their acts, or 
86 Id at 390.
87 Id.
88 See id at 391.
89 Id at 391-92.
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physically preventing them acting in the first place (for example by destroying a terrorist 
base), thereby increasing the cost of terrorist acts.
The purpose of this section is to compare three models of a repressive 
counterterrorist policy: the criminal justice model, the intelligence model, and the war 
model.  I will first discuss the key characteristics, foreign and domestic, of each model.  
Next, I will discuss the advantages and disadvantages of each model.  Third, I will 
compare each model based on three variables: accountability, collectivity, and timing.
Accountability (open or secret) refers to the extent to which state’s preventative activities 
are open to public scrutiny.  Collectivity (individual or group) refers to the specificity of a 
state’s counterterrorist policy, i.e., the extent to which a state’s counterterrorist policy is 
directed at large groups, as opposed to being directed at individuals (or organizations) 
who are suspected of being terrorists. By timing, I mean whether a policy is exclusively 
reactive, or whether proactive measures are utilized by the government.
Three caveats should be mentioned at this point.  First, the three models are not 
mutually exclusive.  There is, for example, a widespread consensus on the importance of 
intelligence, regardless of the approach a government,91 and it seems that every 
government will have to use force to some extent.  These models are therefore not meant 
to be exhaustive set of options available to states employing them, but rather are merely 
analytical tools for understanding the implications of policies and legislation adopted.  
Second, there are options available to governments (for example, training hostage rescue 
specialists) that I this analysis is not concern with because they have no civil liberties 
implications, nor do they reflect choices being made among the models discussed.  
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Finally, the descriptions of the models below (and later the classification of the different 
countries counterterrorist policies) will be functional in nature.  For example, the use of 
special operations personnel or undercover law enforcement agents may come under the 
intelligence model, even though they technically may be military or police units, if their 
use is more akin to the intelligence model when analyzed based on the axes discussed 
above.  The functions and implications of the activity or policy are more important than
its official classification.
Criminal Justice
The criminal justice model refers to a model in which terrorism is primarily 
treated as a crime, and “the onus of response is placed upon criminal prosecution and 
punishment within the rule of law.”92  The criminal justice model therefore prevents 
terrorism in the same manner as any other crime – by deterring would be terrorists 
through the threat of punishment, by communicating society’s condemnation of the act, 
and detaining terrorists, thereby preventing them from committing further acts of 
terrorism.  The paradigmatic use of the criminal justice model will involve the capture 
and prosecution of a suspect after a terrorist act.  With regards to collectivity, therefore, 
the criminal justice model focuses on individuals rather than groups.  In addition, the rule 
of law in liberal democracies depends on the public trials, which makes the criminal 
justice model open on the accountability axis.  Finally, since criminal statutes generally 
have an act requirement, the criminal justice model will depend on the prosecution after 
the fact, making it reactive as opposed to proactive.93
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Since almost all terrorist acts would be criminal regardless of motivation,94 the 
domestic security features of the criminal justice model resemble standard security in a 
liberal democratic state.  Such features include clearly defined criminal statutes, a police 
force which investigates breaches of the law, and punishment after individualized 
determination of guilt in a public trial. Beyond these default features, a state applying a 
criminal justice model may supplement its legal system with mechanisms designed 
specifically for the terrorist threat.  For example, a state may enhance penalties if a crime 
is deemed to be a terrorist act95.  A state may also change rules of evidence and procedure 
in terrorist trials, or create special courts for dealing with terrorism.96 Finally, a state may 
create “advocacy crimes” which criminalize advocacy of violence,97 or criminalize 
membership in certain organizations.98
The international aspects of the criminal justice model are limited.  First, a state 
employing a criminal justice model may increase cooperation with foreign law 
enforcement agencies to aid in the capture and extradition of terrorist suspects.99  Second, 
the criminal justice model will involve cooperation among countries to disrupt terrorists’ 
access to finances by criminalizing the financial support of terrorist groups (this of course 
can also occur at the domestic level).  Finally, the criminal justice model may involve the 
use of sanctions against states which do not cooperate in counterterrorist efforts.  While 
this last example does not intuitively seem like “criminal justice” (and is also collective 
in nature), this strategy is commonly discussed in conjunction with the criminalization of 
Charters ed., 1991) (noting that law enforcement is generally reactive in nature because an investigation 
only begins after there is cause to believe a crime has been committed).
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terrorism.100  In addition, the use of sanctions is more compatible with the rule of law 
than the use of force inherent to the intelligence and war models.
The criminal justice model has several advantages.  First, the criminalization of 
terrorism communicates moral condemnation.  Though this effect may be negligible in 
many instances, in marginal cases such moral condemnation ought to deter some 
terrorism.  This effect can be amplified by the legitimacy of the government criminalizing 
the act.  Second, the prosecution of terrorists pursuant to criminal statutes is less subject 
to political preferences, and is therefore more consistent with the rule of law that is 
essential to democracy.101 For example, the prosecution of a terrorist pursuant to a pre-
existing criminal statute, as opposed to assassination based on determinations made by 
executive officials, is less vulnerable to charges of hypocrisy.  In addition, the 
criminalization of terrorism is an implicitly less violent solution, and is therefore more 
consistent with democratic values.  Both of these in turn increase legitimacy of the state, 
and consequently the moral condemnation of criminalization.  Third, the openness of 
criminal justice system increases the legitimacy of the criminal justice model, and makes 
it less prone to abuses of human rights.102  Finally, Hewitt notes that the prosecution of 
terrorists has had a significant impact on the reduction of violence.103  However, it is 
unclear whether this is merely the result of the incapacitation of the individual terrorist, in 
which case incapacitation outside the criminal justice framework ought to have the same 
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effect.
The criminal justice model has several drawbacks.  First, terrorism as defined here 
is different from ordinary crime.104  Terrorism is more organized than most criminal 
activities, making punishment more difficult.  This leads to a decreased deterrent effect 
for the punishment relative to other crimes.  In addition, since terrorism is politically 
motivated, people are more likely to be sympathetic to their cause than in the case of 
profit-motivated organized crime.  This may translate to greater resources, access to 
recruits, and increased difficulty in detaining suspects because they can seek shelter 
among sympathetic groups.  Terrorism also arouses greater public fear than other 
organized crime, and the stakes may be significantly higher.105
Second, the use of criminal punishment to deter terrorism is hindered in several 
ways.  The deterrent effect of any criminal statute is of course hard to measure.  In 
addition, as I just mentioned, greater organization in the case of terrorism leads to greater 
difficulty in capture, and can therefore lead to an under-enforcement problem.  Finally, 
and perhaps most crucially, in the case of suicide terrorist attacks, it is impossible to 
increase penalties to increase deterrence.106 Moreover, to the extent the squalid economic 
conditions are one of the causes of terrorism, it is arguably impossible to increase 
deterrence in the case of non-suicide terrorism as well.
Third, in the case of terrorism, it may be difficult to achieve the moral 
condemnation which is essential to criminal enforcement because of popular support that 
the terrorist’s cause enjoys.107  The fourth problem with the criminal justice model is 
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almost the opposite:  to the extent that moral condemnation is achieved, the criminal 
justice model precludes later reconciliation with terrorists.108
Finally, and perhaps the most significantly, the criminal justice model tends to be 
reactive in nature.  Given the scale that modern terrorism might take, this may make the 
criminal justice model simply irrelevant in combating the terrorist threat.109  Reactive 
forms of enforcement make sense in cases where the risk of harm for each individual 
incident is small, and is repeated, because penalties and enforcement techniques can be 
adjusted overtime to the optimal level.  In contrast, reactive enforcement is obsolete in 
large scale terrorist attacks, where the penalty cannot be increased beyond punishment for 
a small attack.  More importantly, punishment may be irrelevant because, frankly, the 
damage is done.
In conclusion, the criminal justice model has the primary advantage of being 
consistent with democratic values of openness and rule of law.  It does, however, have 
significant drawbacks, the most significant of which are the difficulty of increasing 
deterrence and its predominantly reactive nature.  It may therefore be an effective tool to 
combat low yield terrorism where the actors are repeat players, but it will be obsolete in 
efforts to combat high yield attacks. 
Intelligence
The intelligence model involves the use of the intelligence apparatus of a state as 
the primary mechanism of counterterrorist policy.  Under this model, terrorism is not 
108 See Wilcox, supra note 100, at 36.  But see Wilkinson, supra note 8, at 101 (arguing that reconciliation 
and criminalization are not incompatible in that criminalization can be limited to those in the terrorist 
groups who are unwilling to work toward peace).
109 See Heymann, supra note 13, at 154 (noting that the threat of terrorism using  weapons of mass 
destruction is qualitatively different than other forms of terrorism).
viewed primarily as a criminal activity, but rather as a threat to the security of the state.110
Terrorists act in small organizations, and once this security issue is recognized, 
policymakers need to know the capabilities, plans, and objectives of these groups.111  The 
goal of intelligence investigations is therefore not condemnation and punishment (and 
thus general deterrence) as in the case of the law enforcement model, but rather to 
“acquire information which will allow those with coercive capacity to prevent an 
undesirable outcome from taking place.”112  The paradigmatic application of the 
intelligence model, therefore, is the use intelligence officers or informants to infiltrate an 
organization to gain information about a group, and to then use that information to thwart 
an attack.113  Like the law enforcement model, therefore, the intelligence model focuses 
individuals and organizations rather than collective populations.  However, unlike the 
criminal justice model the intelligence model tends to be preventive rather than 
reactive.114
In addition to this paradigm several common counterterrorist policies can be 
classified as part of an intelligence model.  First, a state may expand the investigatory 
powers of law enforcement beyond the investigation of criminal activity.  Typically, this 
will involve lower (or no) warrant requirements.115 While these searches may be 
conducted by law enforcement, I have classified them under an intelligence model 
110 See Farnson, supra note 93, at 193.
111
 Wilkinson, supra note 8, at 105-06.
112
 Farnson, supra note 93, at 222.
113 See Heymann, supra note 24, at 101-102.
114 See also Heymann, supra note 13 at 129; Farnson, supra note 93 at 193.
115 See e.g., Hewitt, supra note 50 at 62; Heymann, supra note 13 at 125-26 (noting expansive search 
authority in Northern Ireland under amendments to the Emergency Provisions Act, and in the United States 
under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)).
because they do not require a suspicion of a crime, but rather of a threat to security.116
Closely connected to lower warrant requirements is the availability of involuntary 
confessions,117 the use of which would also tend to push a state away from the criminal 
justice model towards an intelligence model.  Lower search requirements and the use of 
involuntary confessions reflect a key feature of the intelligence model: the need to 
prevent violence, rather than merely punish it, leads to more lenient rules than in the case 
of criminal investigation.118  Both of these features may be folded into a third intelligence 
model feature: the use of domestic intelligence agencies rather than law enforcement for 
internal security.119  Such agencies manifest the same notions as the lower warrant and 
confession requirements: treating security and criminality as distinct problems with 
different solutions.  A fourth feature of the intelligence model is the use of deadly force 
against specific targets.120 Such force would of course occur outside the protection of 
traditional notions of due process, and is therefore antithetical to the criminal justice 
model.121  Finally, an intelligence model may involve the use of secret tribunals to try 
terrorist suspects.  Such tribunals may come under the auspices of the military, but I have 
classified them under the intelligence model because of their secretive nature and the 
specificity of their targets.122
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The primary advantage of the intelligence model is that it compensates for a key 
weakness in the criminal justice model: that terrorism is a more difficult problem than 
ordinary crime and therefore procedural constraints should not constrain counterterrorist
policy.123 At the same time, the intelligence model recognizes that sub-state terrorism is 
also not best handled by conventional military forces.124  In addition, the proactive nature 
of the intelligence model makes it better suited than the criminal justice model for dealing 
with rare and high yield terrorism.  Finally, proponents of targeted assassination under 
the intelligence model argue that it is easier, less costly, and more certain than law 
enforcement.125
There are several disadvantages to the intelligence model.  The activities of 
intelligence agencies are by definition secret.  Not only are intelligence agencies given 
expansive powers of search, and for taking confessions, they are also not limited in what 
they can investigate (law enforcement are limited by the definitions of crimes), and have 
no burden of proof for their findings.126  In addition, the use of targeted assassinations, 
while efficient, effectively allows for the punishment of individuals through executive, 
rather than judicial findings.  Assassinations are “lawless.”127  Furthermore, even where 
the judiciary plays a role in the intelligence model, it is in the form of secret courts which 
have the same accountability problems.  Such secrecy, while useful in counterterrorism 
policy, is antithetical to democratic values.  In short, because of a lack of openness and 
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the potential for arbitrary enforcement, the intelligence model undermines the rule of 
law.128
War
The final model is the war model, under which counterterrorist policy relies on 
the use of the military and retaliatory strikes rather than law enforcement or intelligence 
operations.129 Use of the war model increased during the 1980s because of 
policymakers’ increased attention to the problem of state-sponsored terrorism.130  The use 
of military force was therefore justified under the international laws of self- defense.131
The paradigmatic example of this model is the use of the military against the government 
and population of another state in response to a state’s sponsorship or inaction vis-à-vis a 
terrorist organization.  Like the intelligence model, the war model views terrorism as a 
security problem rather than a criminal one.  But the distinguishing feature of the war 
model in comparison to the criminal justice and the intelligence model is that it relies on 
the use of force against large groups in order to achieve counterterrorist objectives.  With 
regards to accountability, the war model is mixed.  While less accountable than the 
criminal justice model (for which ultimate decision making occurs in the full light of 
public accountability), the war model is inherently less secretive than the intelligence 
model because the scope of the government’s action (e.g., attacking a foreign country) 
cannot occur without some public knowledge and therefore political accountability.  With 
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regards to timing, the military model is also mixed.  Military retaliation is reactive, but 
recent U.S. policy in the area of pre-emptive strikes indicates a move towards a proactive 
war model.  In addition, since many of the domestic measures I will discuss in the war 
model are preventative, I will classify the war model as a proactive rather than reactive 
model.
Intuitively, in the international arena, the war model general employs large scale 
attacks against foreign states132 in order to effectuate counterterrorist policy.  By 
definition these attacks lack precision and may involve significant collateral damage.133
Such attacks can serve several purposes.  First, they can be used preventatively to 
destabilize foreign governments that are considered terrorist threats.  Because we are only 
concerned with sub-state groups, the threat can come from, and the response is directed 
against, states which sponsor terrorism, or against states who may sell arms to terrorists 
(both of which were part of the justification for the U.S. led invasion of Iraq in the spring 
of 2003).  Second, military action can be used against a foreign state as retaliation for a 
terrorist attack (as was the case in the U.S. led war against Afghanistan in the fall of 
2001).
In the domestic arena, the war model is less clear because war is generally seen as 
an act taken by a state against another state.  Based on the framework developed earlier, 
several collective-preventative measures taken by states (in what is sometimes called a 
“security model”134) can be considered part of the war model.  These measures include so 
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called “target hardening” measures which seek to prevent access to potential targets.135  A 
variation of this target hardening measure is to generally restrict the freedom of 
movement, for example across sub-national boundaries, or by requiring identification 
cards.136  In addition, a state may place severe restrictions on immigration in order to 
prevent terrorist infiltration.137  Finally, a state may engage in profiling, based on some 
“cheaply identifiable” characteristics (such as ethnicity or country of origin) in order to 
facilitate the prevention of attacks.  These measures while on their face have little to do 
with war, are similar to other aspects of the war model in that they apply tactics against a 
class of persons which is larger than class of actual targets, because it is more efficient to 
go after the larger class, and it is assumed that the larger class will include the actual 
target.  In other words, like collateral damage in war, these measures force innocents to 
bear the costs of a policy because it is more efficient than being precise.  In addition, 
these measures resemble actual measures taken against groups in times of war, such as 
the internment of Japanese-American in the United States during World War II.  As such, 
the inclusion of these domestic measures in a “war” model is entirely appropriate.
There are several advantages to the war model.  Like the intelligence model, the 
availability of proactive measures affords the war model a significant advantage over the 
criminal justice model.  In addition, the (reactive) use of military strength in retaliation 
for a terrorist attack is entirely consistent with both moral “just war” requirements and 
international law.  In this way, military retaliation accomplishes the same general and 
specific deterrence, and incapacitation, that the criminal justice model accomplishes.138
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In addition, as mentioned earlier, terrorism draws tremendous public attention relative to 
its actual dangers.  A terrorist act will be followed by tremendous public pressure on 
governments to “react.”139  The use of military strength in response to a terrorist attack 
satisfies this need, and therefore has a tremendous political advantage. Arguably, such 
reaction may prevent retaliation by the public against minority groups within the state by 
satiating the public’s need for revenge. Finally, the war model addresses a significant 
weakness in both the criminal justice and intelligence models in that the deterrent effect 
is limited.  Under both the criminal justice and intelligence models, coercive action is 
limited to terrorists themselves.  The deterrent effect of retaliation is capped at the lives 
of the terrorists, and is therefore limited since the punishment for killing one person is the 
same as for killing one-hundred.  In the case of suicide terrorists, the deterrent is non-
existent.  The collectivity of the military models allows States to increase the penalty for 
a terrorist act to include retaliation against states and civilians.140
The war model has several disadvantages.  First, like the intelligence model, the 
main disadvantage of the war model is its effect on civil liberties.  War creates a sense of 
urgency and priority which belittles democracy.141  Moreover, domestic aspects of the 
war model, such as profiling, are archetypal civil rights violations.  Many have also 
argued that policies such as profiling are not only are unjust, they are ineffective because 
of the risk of false positives, wasting resources, and because profiling may cause security 
officials to ignore threats that don’t fit their profile.142
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Second, repressive policies such as profiling may anger minority groups, leading 
to mistrust of government officials, decreasing the likelihood of collaboration with 
minority groups in order to prevent attacks.143  This is part of a broader theme of the war 
model:  both on the domestic level, and the international level, the war model angers 
target populations, and may lead to increased terrorism.144  Many have argued that often 
the purpose of terrorist attacks is to provoke just such a response.145
Third, the deterrent effect of the war model is also questionable.  Heymann notes 
that military strikes against foreign states may fail because the target state of the 
retaliation may not have the capability to stop the terrorist, the strikes may united 
opposition against the retaliating state, and the state may continue to support the group 
but in secret.146  Heymann therefore argues that a State is likely to exaggerate the 
deterrent effect of its military strikes.147 The same is true of collective actions against 
populations rather than states.  Some, such as Alan Dershowitz, have argued in favor of 
collective punishments (such as the destruction of Palestinian villages in response to 
terrorist attacks).  Such policies are folly.  As in the case of actions against states, 
collective action against groups assumes that the groups can stop terrorists’ acts (or that 
the terrorist cares about the rest of the population).  Moreover, it is unclear what the 
deterrent effect of destroying a village is.  Assume that terrorists are rationale, and a 
government makes terrorists aware of its collective punishment policy.  Terrorists would 
take this danger into account before deciding to attack.  They would further not bank on 
their group not being identified  since terrorists often claim responsibility for their attacks.  
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Assume now that the terrorists do engage in an attack.  Clearly, since they were aware of 
the policy, and they did not assume they will not be caught, the destruction of a village 
was not enough to deter the attack.148  Now further assume that the terrorists are 
contemplating a second attack, after a village has been destroyed.  What, now, is the 
deterrent effect of the collective punishment policy?  The terrorists now merely have less
to fear because they have one less village to fear destruction of.  In other words, after 
each successive attack, the terrorists incentives are the same, but their costs are 
decreasing.  A state may of course increase the collective penalty after each attack, but 
there is still a finite amount of punishment a state can dole out.  The deterrent effect of 
collective punishments such as these would therefore decrease consistently after the first 
instance of punishment –  a point which is empirically verified by Hewitt, though it is 
unclear whether this is the underlying reason.149
Finally, the war model makes international cooperation more difficult.  War is a 
political choice, and the war model implies terrorism is political rather than criminal 
act.150  As such, international cooperation would require political agreement, as opposed 
to the criminal act of terrorism for which international cooperation would be easier.151
Second, war breeds mistrust in the international community, regardless of circumstance.  
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Many in Europe, for example, feared that after September 11, the U.S. was using the war 
against terrorism as an excuse to pursue other foreign policy goals.152
To summarize, the war model, while possibly useful with regards to state 
sponsored terrorism, and politically expedient, has significant drawbacks.  Most 
importantly, the war model has significant consequences for human rights, domestically 
and internationally.  These infringements breed support for terrorist causes.  Moreover, 
the deterrent effect of the war model is questionable.  Finally, the war model strains the 
possibility of international cooperation in counter terrorist efforts.
D.  Conclusion
There is always a tension between liberty and security.  Current trends indicate 
that terrorism is not a temporary phenomenon, but one that will continue and perhaps 
increase in the future.  As a result, the effect of counterterrorism policies on civil liberties 
will be a substantial concern in coming years.
An understanding of the effect of counterterrorist policies on civil liberties must 
begin with understanding what we mean by terrorism.  A comprehensive definition of 
terrorism, however, is difficult to derive.  A definition which is under-inclusive is 
vulnerable to charges of hypocrisy, as is an over-inclusive definition which is enforced 
selectively.  Moreover, standard definitions of terrorism may not take into account the 
moral ambiguities involved when individuals choose to engage in violence to achieve 
their goals.  To argue that terrorism is wrong per se is overly-simplistic, and assumes a 
definition to begin with.  Perhaps terrorism is always wrong, but if this is the case, a 
definition must include all condemnable acts, and exclude acts which are not necessarily 
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condemnable.  To this end, I have argued terrorism should be defined as political 
violence against a democracy.  Political violence against a democracy is unnecessary 
(and therefore immoral given the costs) because of the ability to achieve political ends 
through non-violent means.  Moreover, there is less ambiguity in this definition because 
defining a “democracy” is more objective than defining what political causes are “worth” 
violent means and which are not.
In an effort to balance security and liberty, democracies have employed various 
models of counterterrorist policy: the criminal justice model, the intelligence model, and 
the war model.  Each model treats terrorism is a different type of problem, and the 
resulting policies can be analyzed based on three variables:  collectivity (how large to 
target group of the policy is relative to the class of terrorists), accountability (how open 
the policies are to public scrutiny, and timing (whether the model is predominantly 
reactive or proactive).  These variables reflect the security and liberty implications of 
each model.  Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of each model based on these 
variables.  In the next section, I will be discussing the history and development of the 
counterterrorist policies in the United States, Israel, and India paying attention to how the 
policies employed by these countries reflect the choices they make between these models.
Model Key Features Collectivity Accountability Timing
Criminal 
Justice
Legal definitions, criminal 
prosecution, statutory 
penalties, changes in 
evidentiary rules
Extradition, diplomatic 
sanctions
Specific Open Reactive
Intelligence infiltration of groups, 
disruption of plans, 
targeted assassination, 
secret trials
Specific Secret Proactive
War pre-emptive or retaliatory 
strikes, profiling, 
immigration control
Group Secret decision-
making; public 
awareness
proactive
Table 1
III.  Comparing Approaches to Counterterrorism
Earlier, I discussed the criminal justice, intelligence, and war models of 
counterterrorism.  Each model reflects choices that a country makes about the nature of 
the terrorist threat, the risk of harm, and choices how to balance the need for security with 
the desire for liberty.  In addition, the models are not mutually exclusive, nor do all their 
features fit neatly into the variables of accountability, collectivity, and timing.  However, 
these models are a useful analytical tool for categorizing a country’s approach.  In this 
section, I will discuss the counterterrorist policies of the United States, Israel, and India.  
I will begin each analysis with a history of the conflicts underlying the terrorism.  Next I 
will discuss counterterrorist polices adopted by each country, including statutory 
provisions.  Finally, I will discuss any changes in each country’s policy since the attacks 
of September 11, 2001.
A.  United States
In many ways, the United States is not a good case for studying counterterrorist
policy.  The United States is different from the other examples in this study in several 
ways, which affect the way its counterterrorist policies should be viewed. First, although 
terrorist organizations have a specific set of grievances, anti-American terrorism cannot 
be traced to a specific conflict in the same way that the other cases in this study can.  
Terrorism in India is facet of various ethnic and regional conflicts.  Anti-Israel terrorism
is the result of either Israel’s existence (which upon creation, it is argued, forced 
Palestinians from their rightful lands), or Israeli policy in the Occupied Territories, 
depending on one’s point of view.  In contrast, anti-American international terrorism is at 
best defined as the result of a “clash of civilizations”, a concept which was described by 
Samuel Huntington in 1996.153  Under this view, anti-American terrorism is an assault 
against the West, with America as its hegemon.  A variation on this argument is that anti-
American terrorism is the result of globalization, with the United States as the leader in a 
neo-liberal Westernization at the hands of multinational corporations.154 But even if one 
does not subscribe to this assessment, anti-American terrorism is the result of a set of 
grievances, that while definable, is best described as a vague notion of “American foreign 
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policy.”155  The United States is the only country in this analysis, therefore, where 
terrorism is not a facet of another discreet conflict.  Second, anti-American terrorism is 
unique because of the American role in world politics.  Because of American power, its 
counterterrorist policies play a significant role in influencing the way counterterrorist
policies are perceived.  American action sets precedent, thereby legitimating otherwise 
unjustified acts.156 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, terrorism does not pose the 
same threat to the state as terrorism in India and Israel does.  In the case of Israel, terrorist 
organizations such as Hamas have asserted that their objective is not merely the end of a 
set of discrete Israeli policies, but rather then elimination of Israel itself.157  In the case of 
India, while terrorist organizations have not sought the destruction of the State, Indian 
government policies in Jammu and Kashmir are the result of Indian fears about the 
destruction of secularism which is at the core of Indian identity.158  In contrast, while 
terrorism is a threat to the safety of Americans, few would argue that the State itself is 
threatened by anti-American terrorism.  Rather, in the case of the United States, the threat 
to the State comes not from terrorism, but the response to terrorism.
History
Anti-American terrorism first became a concern of the U.S. government in the 
1970s when terrorists began engaging in hijackings, assassinations, bombings, and 
hostage takings aimed at U.S. interests.159  Between 1968 and 1986, the number of anti-
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American attacks increased from 54 to 139.160  However, as mentioned earlier unlike in 
the case of Israel and India, anti-American terrorism cannot be traced to a discrete 
conflict.  Rather is the result of a more vague policy orientation of the United States 
government.  Anti-American terrorism can be broken down into two categories: domestic 
and foreign.
First, anti-American domestic terrorism generally refers to a wave of anti-
government terrorism that grew and then faded away in the 1990s.  Such domestic 
terrorist groups generally subscribed to extreme right-wing philosop hies, and sought to 
destroy the power of the federal government of the United States.161 These philosophies 
were interwoven with millennial fears and also involved white-supremacist and 
isolationist ideologies.162 In 1998, total membership in these militias was estimated to be 
between ten and fifteen million, with 100,000 active members.163 Public awareness of 
such groups peaked in the mid-1990s after the bombing of the Alfred R. Murrah Federal 
Office Building in Oklahoma City in April, 1995.164  After an initial backlash against 
Arab-Americans, it was discovered that the bombing was perpetrated by domestic 
terrorists who were subsequently arrested and charged criminally.165  Today, however, 
domestic terrorism is seemingly an insignificant threat. because the events of September 
11 have overshadowed the domestic terrorist threat.  But while domestic terrorism is of 
minor significance today, it does provide context for some of the legislation discussed in 
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this study, while also providing useful point of comparison for policies adopted since 
September 11.
Of more interest to this analysis is the history of foreign terrorism against the 
United States.  Such foreign terrorism has predominantly come from extremist Islamist 
groups, who many argue are reacting to a history of intervention in the affairs of the 
Muslim world. First, as Kellner notes U.S. intervened in Afghanistan in the late 1970s in 
the 1980s after the Soviet invasion.  After providing billions of dollars of support to the 
Afghan resistance, however, the U.S. government under George H.W. Bush withdrew 
entirely from Afghanistan, allowing a civil war to ensue that subsequently led to the rise 
of the Taliban.166 Second, U.S. tolerance for the authoritarian regime in Saudi Arabia in 
pursuit of oil interests has caused significant Muslim anger at the United States.167  Third, 
the role of the U.S. government in imposing sanctions against Iraq after the 1991 Gulf 
War, which subsequently led to a significant humanitarian crisis, has also been cited as a 
cause of significant anti-American sentiment.168  Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, 
American support for Israel over the matter of Palestine is widely cited grievance of 
terrorists groups which target the United States.169  While George W. Bush has refused to 
meet with Yasir Arafat,170 for example, Israel continues to receive more foreign aid than 
all of sub-Saharan Africa.171  Finally, some have argued that U.S. inaction (or late action) 
in the Balkans, Chechnya, and Kashmir is widely seen as the result of a hypocritical U.S. 
foreign policy which is indifferent to the concerns of Muslims.
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Islamist terrorist groups engaged in several acts of terrorism in the 1970s and 
1980s.  For example, 1979, revolutionaries seized the U.S. Embassy in Teheran and took 
52 diplomats hostage.172  Other incidents during the 1980s include the bombing of 
Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983 173, the hijacking of the Achillo Lauro in the 
Mediterranean in 1985174, and the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Scotland in 
1988.175  Major incidents continued in the 1990s, including: the first World Trade Center 
bombing in February 1993176; the bombing of the Khobar towers in Saudi Arabia in 
1996177; and the simultaneous bombings of U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar al 
Salaam, Tanzania in 1998.178  In October 2000, terrorists bombed the U.S.S. Cole while it 
was at port in Yemen.179  Finally, on September 11, 2001, terrorist hijacked four airliners 
over the United States and crashing them into the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and 
outside Shanksville, Pennsylvania.180
Legislation
A complex array of statutes governed U.S. counterterrorist policy.  Notably, 
through the 1970s and 1980s, Congress enacted a series of acts which strengthened the 
ability of federal agencies to fight terrorism.  In 1974, Congressed passed the 
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Antihijacking Act and the Air Transportation Security Act which gave the FAA authority 
over aircraft terrorism.181  In 1984, Congress passed the Act to Combat International 
Terrorism, giving the Department of Justice and the FBI more direct authority to 
investigate and prosecute those who commit crimes against Americans abroad.182  In 
addition, the Omnibus Anti-terrorism Act of 1986 made terrorist acts against Americans 
abroad a federal crime, permitting arrest overseas for trial in U.S. courts.183
Congress also passed several acts which were designed to deal with the problem 
of state sponsored terrorism.  In 1979, Congress passed an amendment to the Export 
Administration Act, which called for the Secretary of State to designate States that 
consistently support terrorism.184  This law, combined with others, allowed the U.S. to 
impose sanctions against “state sponsors” of terrorism.185  The Anti-terrorism and Arms 
Export Amendments Act of 1989 prohibited arms exports to states designated as state 
sponsors of terrorism.186  States designated as state sponsors of terrorism include Libya, 
Iraq, Iran, Syria, North Korea, and Cuba.187
With regards to investigation of terrorist organizations domestically, the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), allows investigators to seek warrants from a secret 
FISA court when the purpose of the warrant is to gather foreign intelligence.188  Unlike 
criminal warrants, which were governed by standards promulgated in the Omnibus Crime 
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Control Act of 1968, 189 FISA warrants can be issued without probable cause of a crime 
as long as the government can show probable cause that the primary purpose of the 
warrant is to gather intelligence against a foreign power including foreign terrorist 
organizations.190  Since its inception in 1978, court has issued more than 10,000 FISA 
warrants, and denied only one.191
After the Oklahoma City bombing, Congress passed the Anti-terrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).192  The Act has several provisions not 
directly related to counterterrorism policy, including provisions amending habeas corpus 
procedures generally.  With respect to counterterrorist efforts, AEDPA first had several 
provisions which were designed to discourage state support of terrorist groups.  For 
example, the statute establishes jurisdiction in U.S. courts for civil suits against state 
which sponsor terrorism by creating an exception to the general rule of sovereign 
immunity.193  In addition, the Act prohibits military and other assistance to state sponsors 
of terrorism.194  Second, the Act requires the Secretary of State to designate certain 
groups as “Foreign Terrorist Organizations” (FTOs)195  Among other things, such a 
designation allowed the government to freeze the assets of such organizations,196 and 
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criminalized support to such organizations.197  Third, the act provided for a procedure for 
removal, exclusion, and denial of asylum to alien terrorists.198 Finally, the act contained 
significant criminal provisions related to counterterrorist efforts.  These included the 
prohibition on providing assistance to FTOs,199 engaging in financial transactions with 
state sponsors of terrorism,200 criminal sanctions related to developing biological 
weapons201 and plastic explosives,202 and a range of enhanced penalties related to acts of 
or conspiracies to engage in terrorism.203
Executive Action
While of course always present, use of the military and intelligence apparatus in 
American counterterrorist efforts was limited through the 1990s.  For example, President  
Nixon, employed a “collective security” approach which relied on cooperation with other 
states to encourage extradition and prosecution of suspects.204  The Ford and Carter 
administrations followed a substantially similar approach,205 with the latter focusing 
substantially on root causes of terrorism.206  The Reagan Administration focused slightly 
more on a military approach, however, with CIA director William Casey referring to 
international terrorism as a “war without borders.”207  This policy most notably included 
the bombing of Tripoli in 1985.208  Reagan also established a policy of pre-emptive 
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military action.209 Ultimately, however, use of the military through the Reagan 
Administration was limited, with Presidents Johnson, Nixon, and Carter launching no 
punitive military attacks, while Presidents Ford and Reagan launching only one each.210
The Clinton Administration’s use of force, while greater, was also limited.  After it was 
discovered that Iraqi intelligence officials were responsible for an assassination attempt 
on President George H.W. Bush, Clinton launched cruise missile attacks against Iraqi 
military installations.211  Clinton launched another cruise missile attack against Sudan 
after the 1998 embassy bombings.212
Rather, the emphasis of the Clinton administration in the 1990s was on the use of 
legal mechanisms to deter terrorism.  In describing U.S. counterterrorist policy, for 
example, Phillip C. Wilcox Jr., former U.S. Coordinator for Counterterrorism under the 
Clinton Administration argues that the seven pillars of U.S. policy include a substantial 
focus on terrorism as a crime, the use of apprehension of terrorists for deterrence, the use 
of diplomacy to bring terrorists to justice, and the use of sanctions to isolate states that 
harbor terrorists.213  For example, in 1997 the Clinton Administration issued Presidential 
Decision Directive 39, which stated that the United States will support counterterrorist
efforts by increasing cooperation with foreign governments and effectuating deterrence 
through arrest and criminal prosecution.214  Notable prosecutions during the Clinton
Administration include 1) the perpetrators of the first World Trade Center bombing, such 
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as Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman215 and Ramsi Youssef, with the latter being prosecuted 
after considerable efforts to arrest him in Pakistan216 , and 2) the indictment of 14 
members of the Saudi Hizballah in June 1996 for the bombing of the Khobar Towers.217
Finally, although FISA substantially lowered the burden of proof required when 
investigators sought warrants intended to gather intelligence on foreign terrorist 
organizations, the Clinton Administration continued to employ a higher criminal standard 
when choosing to apply for those warrants.218  Thus, even when it was not required to do 
so, the Clinton Administration emphasized counterterrorist efforts within traditional 
criminal justice principles.
Post – September 11 Developments
September 11 changed counterterrorist policies in many countries, and no where 
is this more apparent in the United States.  The scale of the attacks was without precedent 
in the realm of sub-state terrorists, and occurred on American soil.  It was widely 
reported that the flights that crashed in Pennsylvania and into the Pentagon were intended 
to crash into the Whitehouse and Capitol.  President Bush spent most of the day flying to 
and from secure locations, and Vice-President Cheney subsequently resided in an 
undisclosed location so as to keep the President and Vice-President in separate places.  In 
short, the United States entered a crisis mode, which in some ways that it has yet to come 
out of. Congress enacted several pieces of legislation in the months following the 
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attacks.  These included:  the Aviation and Transportation Security Act219; the 
Bioterrorism Response Act of 2001220; the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry 
Reform Act of 2002221; the Terrorist Bombings Convention Implementation Act of 
2001222; and Victims of Terrorism Relief Act of 2001223 The most important piece of 
legislation, however, was the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA 
Patriot).224  Due to a fear of further attacks, the bill was considered on an accelerated 
timetable, bypassing both the committee process and floor debate, and was ultimately 
passed by wide margins (357-66 in the House and 98-1 in the Senate).225
USA Patriot had several components that were intended to improve the ability of 
the domestic security apparatus to prevent further attacks.  First, the Act attempts to 
remove barriers to cooperation between the intelligence and law enforcement 
communities.  Historically, due to legal and political barriers, law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies in the United States did not sufficiently cooperate in furthering 
counterterrorist efforts.226  While political barriers could not be resolved legislatively, 
USA Patriot sought to remove legal barriers to cooperation by authorizing increased 
information sharing between agencies.  For example, the Act modifies grand jury rules to 
allow disclosure of historically secret grand jury testimony to federal officials without a 
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court order.227  It also more generally allowed information sharing between law 
enforcement, intelligence, immigration, and national security officials.228
Second, the Act had several provisions which increased the domestic surveillance 
capabilities of law enforcement and intelligence officials.  For example, the Act included 
provisions which expanded the use of FISA to include the use of pen registers, trap and 
trace devices229 and roving wiretaps.230  These provisions were uncontroversial, however 
because, many of these capabilities were already available for criminal investigations.231
Of greater controversy was the expansion of the definition of pen registers, and trap and 
trace devices to include devices which allow the tracking of e-mail and Internet usage.232
Civil libertarians argued that this was a significant expansion in the government’s 
surveillance authority, which would require a significant faith in the government not to 
use such information for improper purposes.233  Moreover, although the monitoring 
authority was not extended to the “content” of an e-mail, “content” remained undefined 
(for example in the case of e-mail subject lines).234
The surveillance capabilities of the government were also substantially increased 
through an expansion of the ability of investigators to obtain FISA warrants.  As 
discussed earlier, FISA authorized wiretaps where the purpose of the tap was to obtain 
intelligence about a foreign power (including a terrorist organization).  USA Patriot 
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changed the word “purpose” to “significant purpose” in the FISA warrant requirement.235
As result, the lower standards of the FISA requirement could be applied where the 
government intended the information to be used in a criminal investigation, as long as 
there was also a “significant purpose” of gaining intelligence information.236  On October 
31, 2001, Attorney General Ashcroft ruled that the government may also eavesdrop on 
phone calls between lawyers and clients if there was “reasonable suspicion” to justify 
such a move.237
Third, the Act also increases the surveillance capabilities of the government in the 
area of financial transactions.  Prior to September 11, international financing and money 
laundering for terrorist networks was widely regarded as a significant problem.238  To 
correct for this, USA Patriot requires banks to monitor and report suspicious 
transactions.239  Such reports are to be shared by the Treasury Department to the 
intelligence and law enforcement communities.240  The Act also provides for government 
access to credit records without notification.241
Finally, USA Patriot greatly expands the ability of the government to detain
individuals who have not been convicted of criminal or immigration violations. Under the 
AEDPA of 1996 legislation, the government was authorized to detain and remove aliens 
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convicted of certain crimes.242  Where their home countries would not accept them, these 
convicted persons were detained indefinitely.243  USA Patriot expands power of the 
government to detain non-citizens suspected of terrorism for seven days, after which 
criminal or immigration charges must be brought.244  However, since under the 1996 
legislation, indefinite detention is allowed where the country of origin will not accept a 
detainee, in effect USA Patriot allows for the indefinite detention of aliens suspected of 
terrorism.245
USA Patriot is only one facet of a greater move of the U.S. government away 
from the democratic principles in counterterrorist efforts.  While USA Patriot allows for 
the indefinite detention of aliens suspected of terrorism where their country of origin will 
not accept them, in several cases, the government has exerted this authority in the case of 
U.S. citizens suspected of terrorist activity.  For example, Yasser Hamdi is an American 
citizen who was apparently captured on the battlefield in Afghanistan and is currently 
being detained in a military brig, having been designated an “enemy combatant” by the 
government.246  In July 2003, the Fourth Circuit held that Hamdi could not challenge his 
designation as an enemy combatant.247  The court stated that because a wartime president 
was due great deference in conducting a fight against terrorism, courts should not 
question Hamdi’s detention as a result of his designation as an “enemy combatant.”248  In 
other case, Jose Padilla, an American citizen, born in Brooklyn, was arrested by federal 
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agents in May 2003 at O'Hare International Airport in Chicago.249  Padilla stands accused 
of planning to detonate a “dirty bomb” on American soil.250  The U.S. government has 
held Padilla in solitary confinement, without trial and without access to a lawyer.251 The 
case of Mr. Padilla demonstrates the worst fears of civil libertarians:  a citizen, born in 
the United States, accused of committing a crime in the United States, and arrested on 
American soil, cannot avail himself of the criminal justice system because of the 
government accuses him of being a terrorist.  In late 2003, the Second Circuit held that 
the President’s constitutional powers “do not extend to the detention as an enemy 
combatant of an American citizen seized within the country away from a zone of 
combat.”252  Furthermore, the court held that the detention of Padilla was in violation of 
the Non-Detention Act, which provides that, “no citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise 
detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress.” 253
Moreover, even in cases where criminal charges have been brought, the 
government has indicated that where it is convenient, it is willing to move prosecution 
outside the auspices of the criminal justice system.  For example, Ali Saleh Kahlah Al-
Marri, a Qatari student, was charged with lying to the FBI and credit card fraud.254  Al-
Marri was later designated an enemy combatant and moved into military custody.  This 
case represents the first time an individual who originally faced criminal charges has 
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been moved into enemy combatant status.255  In the case of Zacarias Moussaoui the 
alleged “20th hijacker” in the September 11 attacks, the U.S. government has indicated a 
willingness to move the criminal prosecution to a military tribunal if the courts upheld the 
Moussaoui’s Sixth Amendment right to prepare a defense by speaking with suspected al-
Qaeda members being held by the government.256 These examples are consistent with 
the Bush administration policy, announced on November 13, 2001, that foreign terrorists 
would be tried in military tribunals, rather than criminal courts.257  Such tribunals would 
be made up military officers, members of the executive branch, rather than an 
independent judiciary.  Rules of evidence are substantially relaxed, and the identity of 
witnesses hidden.258  No civilian judicial review is available.259
Finally, the administration has used other executive rules to increase its ability to 
detain persons in furtherance of its war on terror.  For example, the executive branch has 
wide discretion in the administration of immigration laws.  Since September 11, the U.S. 
government has used this discretion for the purposes of interrogation or incapacitation, 
for example by delaying hearings or deportations for persons who have technically 
violated visa regulations.260 Another technique involves the use of material witness 
warrants to detain individuals who are apart of a large an indefinite class of prospective 
grand jury witnesses.261 Both of these techniques have been used to reach a broad class 
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of individuals who may be connected to terrorism, in order to reach a narrow class of 
individuals for whom probable cause exists.  Using these techniques, the Bush 
Administration had arrested or detained over 1200 persons, mostly Muslim or Arab, by 
November 2001.262
Internationally, the policy of the U.S. government since the September 11 attacks 
has been to emphasize the proactive use of military force to deter and prevent terrorist 
attacks.263  With regards to the specific class of terrorists, the Government has engaged in 
several actions which demonstrate a move away from the use of law to prevent terrorism.
First, as discussed already, President Bush signed and executive order providing for the 
trial of terrorists in military tribunals.  In the case of combatants captured in Afghanistan, 
the U.S. detained these combatants at the U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.  
These combatants were, according to the Bush Administration, “unlawful combatants”, 
occupying a gray area between laws, neither prisoners of war protected by the Geneva 
Conventions, nor criminals subject to the benefits of the U.S. criminal justice system.264
Second, the U.S. has captured terrorists off the battlefield, via efforts on the part of the 
intelligence community along with cooperation with foreign governments.  For example, 
the U.S. captured Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, a top Al-Qaeda operative in Pakistan in 
March 2003.265 However, in contrast to terrorists captured in very similar circumstances 
in the 1990s, such as Ramzi Youssef (participant in the 1993 World Trade Center 
Bombing), Mohammad remains in the custody of the intelligence community, and has yet 
to be charged with a crime.  Finally, in some cases, the U.S. has engaged in a policy of 
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targeted assassination of terrorists suspects.  For example, in November 2002, it was 
widely reported that a Predator drone had been used to assassinate al Qaeda operatives in 
Yemen.266  While prior to September 11, there was a substantial debate within the U.S. 
government as to the merits of such action,267 apparently that debate was resolved in 
favor of assassination.
More generally, the U.S. has declared a policy of pre-emptive military strikes in 
order deter future attacks.  The administration first employed a broad based military 
operation as part of the war on terrorism in Afghanistan.  President Bush’s statement to 
the public on the day that war began made it clear that this conduct was part of the “war 
on terror.”268  Later, the administration announced the so called “Bush Doctrine” of pre-
emptive military strikes on states that pose an imminent threat to the United States.269
Subsequently, the U.S. launched an invasion of Iraq to topple the regime of Saddam 
Hussein.  The justifications for this pre-emptive war were varied.  The administration 
discussed Saddam Hussein’s support for terrorist groups (while never specifically stating
that Saddam Hussein was connected to the September 11 attacks).270  The administration 
also discussed the repressive regime of Saddam Hussein, under which hundreds of 
thousands of Iraqis had been killed.271  Most notably, the administration argued that the 
Iraqi regime had continuously tried to develop weapons of mass destruction in defiance 
of U.N. Security Council Resolutions.  Such weapons posed an “imminent risk” to 
American security because they could be provided to terrorists targeting the United 
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States.272  Subsequent to the end of major fighting in Iraq, the Bush Administration 
declared that Iraq was now the “central front” in the war on terror (seemingly because 
international terrorists has descended upon Iraq oppose the U.S. presence there).273  Thus, 
while the connection between Iraq and terrorism is debatable to many, the war in Iraq 
was almost certainly a part of the U.S. government’s “war on terror.”274
B.  Israel
 Terrorism has plagued the territory that is today Israel since before the creation of 
that State, and, particularly after the September 11 attacks, Israeli policy was viewed by 
many as a useful model for emulation.275 However, the Israeli terrorism experience 
differs from the American in several ways.  First, and most importantly, unlike the United 
States, since its creation counterterrorist policy has been a critical aspect of Israel’s 
security structure.  This is because, unlike in the case of other countries, the object of 
many groups that target Israel is to destroy the state itself.276 Second, while the United 
States has confronted issue of state sponsored terrorism, the role of other Arab states in 
anti-Israel terror is particularly poignant.  Anti-Israel terror by Palestinian militants was 
often a low-cost proxy war being waged by Arab states against Israel, in which Arab 
states could attack Israel, while avoiding risking the lives of their own nationals.277
Finally, while there is a steady stream of attacks against both the United States and Israel, 
the United States has not faced a situation comparable to the Intafda which rose in 1987, 
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or more recently the 2000 al-Aqsa Intafda).  Many argue that such conditions resemble 
insurrections,278 or a war between two states,279 rather than terrorist campaigns.  As a 
result, unlike in the American case anti-Israel terrorism is merely a facet of a wider 
conflict.  These factors, and the geography of the Middle East itself, yield an Israeli 
terrorist experience which is drastically different from the American one.
History
While anti-American terrorism is a response to globalization, or a set of 
conditions believed to constitute American foreign policy, anti-Israeli terrorism can be 
traced to a discrete issue, namely, the establishment of the state of Israel in the Middle 
East.  This grievance has since been expanded to include the allegedly illegal occupation 
of Arab lands, and Israeli treatment of Palestinians under their authority.280
After World War I, and the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Palestine was entrusted to 
Great Britain.281  The British opened Palestine up to Jewish immigration, the subsequent 
influx of whom led to periodic violence between to the two groups.282  After y ears of 
conflict, including violence perpetrated by Jewish rebel groups such as the Irgun Zvai 
Leumi (Irgun gang) and the Lohamy Heruth Israel (LEHI, or Stern Gang), the State of 
Israel was established on May 14, 1948.283  Immediately, members of the Arab league 
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declared war on the newly established Jewish state.284  Conflicts followed in 1956-57, 
1967, 1969-1970, 1972, and 1982.285
During the 1950s, Palestinians based in Syria, Egypt and Jordan staged cross-
border attacks against Israel, which were met with Israeli military operations against the 
host governments.286  The Palestinian Liberation Organization was founded in 1964, and 
during the subsequent decades, anti-Israeli terrorism, at the hands of organizations such 
as Al-Fatah, or the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP ) became regular 
phenomena.287  Attacks were directed both internally and externally, most memorably 
involving the killing of eleven Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics in 1972.288
The conflict was complicated by the Israeli occupation, after their victory 
following a pre-emptive strike in the 1967 war, of the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, the 
West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights,.289  From 1967 to 1974, the Labor 
government and its Defense minister Moshe Dayan, engaged in a policy of limiting the 
Israeli presence in the Occupied Territories in order to curb animosity towards the 
occupying force.290  With the rise of a government of the right-wing Likud party in the 
late 1970s, however, this policy was reversed in favor of increased visibility of the Israeli 
occupation, including less attention paid to the treatment of residents of the territories, 
and the creation of a policy of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza strip which 
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involved expropriation of uncultivated Arab lands in those territories.291  These policies 
eventually culminated in the first Intafada (popular uprising) in 1987.
In the 1990s, beginning with talks in Madrid in 1991, a series of peace agreements 
nurtured the hope of an end to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.  In 1993 Prime Minister 
Yitzhak Rabin and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres from Israel and PLO Chairman Yasser 
Arafat signed the Declaration of Principles (the Oslo Agreement).292  This along with 
subsequent agreements such as Oslo I in 1994, Oslo II in 1995, the Hebron agreement in 
1995, the Wye River Memorandums of 1998 and 1999 established and implemented a 
framework for a lasting peace.  During this time, the Israeli Defence Ministry reported a 
greater than 90% decline in the terrorism in Israel and the Occupied Territories.293 In 
September 2000, with peace talks at a critical juncture, Likud Knesset member Ariel 
Sharon visited the Temple Mount, setting of the new Al-Aqsa Intafada.294  The peace 
talks were subsequently tabled by Prime Minister Barak in October 2000.295  Sharon was 
elected to Prime Minister in February 2001.296
Legislation
Like any country, Israel’s Penal law is one mechanism to punish terrorism when 
the act in and of itself would be criminal,297 and Israeli law permits the death penalty in 
cases of terrorism.298  In addition, unlike American law, Israeli law makes failure to 
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prevent a felony a misdemeanor punishable by up to two years imprisonment.299  Such a 
statute allows for the prosecution of those who do not directly participate in terrorist acts.  
Other provisions of the penal law also provide Israeli courts with extraterritorial 
jurisdiction in the cases of crimes against humanity, against the State of Israel, or against 
Israeli residents or national.300
The most significant legislation, however, is Israel’s Prevention of Terrorism 
Ordinance, enacted in 1948.301  While terrorism is not defined in the Ordinance, 
management or membership in a terrorist organization is punishable by imprisonment up 
to 20 years or 5 years, respectively.302 The act also criminalizes support for a terrorist 
organization, such as providing money, resources or a place for a meeting.303
Significantly, the act differs from U.S. law by making advocacy on behalf a terrorist 
organization or the possession of propaganda from a terrorist organization, criminal 
offenses punishable by up to a 1000 pound fine and three years imprisonment.304  A 1980 
amendment to the Ordinance also makes public displays of support, such as displaying a 
flag or slogan, a criminal act.305 Finally, the 1948 Ordinance granted broad authority to 
the military to enforce many of its provisions.  For example, the military was granted the 
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authority to confiscate any property of a terrorist organization,306 and to close down any 
facility which services a terrorist organization or their members.307  Furthermore, 
offenses under the statute were to be prosecuted by military tribunals,308 under the 
procedures of military courts.309  Judgments of the military tribunals were reviewed by 
the Minister of Defense,310 but not subject to civilian judicial review.311  However, the 
military role was removed when these provisions were repealed in the 1980 Amendments 
to the Ordinance.312
The final consideration for understanding Israeli anti-terrorist legislation is the 
Proclamation on Law and Administration which was made at the time of Israeli of 
occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.  The Proclamation is a continuation of 
the British Mandate Defense (Emergency) Regulations which were enacted in 1945.313
These regulations granted broad authority to the military to detain and try suspected 
terrorists.314  In addition, to serve as a deterrent to person who would give shelter to 
terrorists, the military was given the authority to demolish homes or dwellings of
terrorists caught or killed.315 The legal obligations in the occupied territories were 
complicated however, given the concurrent applications of Israeli, military, and local 
law.316  In practice, this led to two justice systems based on the nationality of the accused, 
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with Jewish Underground terrorists being tried in Israeli courts, and others being tried in 
military tribunals.317
Executive Action
The primary responsibility for Israeli counterterrorist policy is placed in one of 
Israel’s three intelligence services: the General Security Service (GSS, or SHABAK), the 
Israeli Defense Forces Intelligence Branch, and the Mossad (Israeli intelligence 
services).318  In addition to the measures discussed earlier, several aspects of Israel’s 
domestic security apparatus are worth mentioning here.  First, like in the United States, 
Israeli investigators have broader investigative capabilities than are available in regular 
criminal investigations.  For example, Israel allowed for “investigative arrests” and 
prolonged interrogations in cases of political violence.319  Until recently, these measures 
were generally not available in the United States.  Moreover, Israel allows its intelligence 
agencies to act outside the rules that generally restrict law enforcement personnel as long 
as the fruits of their investigation are used by policymakers, rather than as evidence in 
criminal trials.320  This practice comports with U.S practice prior to September 11, but as 
discussed earlier, under USA-Patriot, American investigators now operate under relaxed 
rules, even if they intend the information to be used in criminal trials.
Related to this is the use of torture by Israeli intelligence officials.  The GSS took 
primary responsibility in internal security.  While their operations were generally secret, 
in 1987, their procedures came under scrutiny through an internal government 
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investigation that became known as the Landau Report.321  Among other things, the 
report found that the GSS had used force to extract information and confessions from 
terrorist suspects.322 The report also found that GSS officers, with the assistance of 
military attorneys, had deliberately deceived judges when suspects had claimed that their 
confessions were extracted by illegal means.323  The report ultimately legitimized 
psychological tactics, and moderate physical pressure to extract information, but 
specifically prohibited torture.324  Israeli courts have also banned the use of torture in 
investigations.325
The Israeli security apparatus is also subject to substantially less oversight than in 
the American case.  As already mentioned, oversight in the case of torture was made 
difficult by GSS officers deliberately misleading judges about the use of torture.  In 
another case, in 1984, the government has actively covered up the role of GSS officers in 
the killing of two terrorists in their custody.  The government took steps to censor press 
reports of the incident, and the subsequent internal GSS investigation was classified.  
Eventually, GSS officers were cleared by an internal disciplinary committee, despite the 
fact that they were guilty of murder.326  After the Prime Minister was told of the events, 
he reprimanded the officials for giving him information he did not want to hear.  
Eventually, after the attorney general launched an investigation into the events, four 
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senior GSS officials were pardoned for their role.327 In contrast, in 1995, the CIA under 
President Clinton fired two senior officials and reprimanded others after it was 
discovered that one of their sources had been involved in the murder of a U.S. citizen and 
the husband of another citizen.328
Finally, internal counterterrorist measures have often led to a visible and large 
scale security state in Israel.  This policy has already been discussed in the context of 
Likud policy in the Occupied Territories in the 1970s.329  The policy has also included 
significant target hardening, such as the development of an extensive security apparatus 
to protect air traffic to and from Israel.330  In situations where Israel has found itself with 
insufficient information to thwart specific attacks, it has often resorted to “lock-down” 
mechanisms, involving security screenings in public places, and the limiting of the 
freedom of movement, especially the movement of Palestinians to and from the Occupied  
Territories.331  As a result of these measures, it has been argued that these measures have 
turned the State of Israel into a “garrison-police state.”332
Israel’s counterterrorism policy in the occupied territories was developed and is 
implemented primarily by the IDF.333  The policy has generally invoked the use of 
maximum force, and involved three general principles: “1) Israeli territory must be sealed 
up against terrorists; 2) Israel will hit back at the terrorists no matter where they are; and 
3) neighboring and enemy states, including their civilian populations, that host, tolerate 
on their soil, and shelter anti-Israel terrorists cannot evade responsibility and escape 
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being drawn into this violent circle.”334  This policy manifested itself first in Jordan, 
where Israeli reprisals led to the expulsion of Palestinian terrorists in 1970.335  Later 
retaliations against Syria led to restrictions by the Syrian government on attacks by 
Palestinians from within Syria or the Golan Heights.336 Finally, after the inability of 
Lebanon to control attacks from within its borders (due to civil war in that country), 
Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982.  However, some have argued that while this military 
approach was understandable in the first decades of Israel’s existence (when terrorism 
was a part of hostile relations with Arab states), it has been more the result of intuition 
and inertia than strategic calculation in recent years.337
Recent Developments
As discussed earlier, in September 2000, a new Intafada erupted in the Occupied 
Territories after then Knesset member Ariel Sharon visited the Temple Mount, angering 
the Arab population.  This Al-Aqsa Intafada has changed the nature of the threat faced by 
Israel, predominantly in scale.  The new threat, it has been argued, more closely 
resembles a war between states than a terrorist threat.338  As a result of these events, 
peace negotiations ended in October 2000, and Sharon was elected to Prime Minister in 
February 2001.  The immediate effect of these events from the security perspective is the 
reversion to the security state apparatuses referred to earlier.  For example, using the 
military, Israel has created a large-scale defensive security system throughout the 
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settlements, and transportation routes to and from them, in the Occupied Territories.339 In 
addition, the Israeli Defense Ministry, along with other agencies, has deployed large 
numbers of security guards in public areas inside Israel.340
Given this escalation in the year prior, it would perhaps be understandable if the 
events of September 11 did not significantly alter the situation in the Israel.  
Alternatively, decreased American pressure on Israel in light of its own experiences, may 
have allowed for an escalation in the Isr  In other words, the American government was 
less likely to criticize Israel for responding harshly to terrorist attacks, either because (a) 
it substantively “understood” Israel’s action; (b) the American public would not tolerate 
criticism of Israel as a kindred victim of terrorist attacks; (c) in light of the Bush 
Administration’s “us/them” binary, criticism of Israel would be viewed as “siding with 
the terrorists”; or (d) because American pressure would have appeared hypocritical in 
light of America’s response to September 11.
There is some evidence of these escalations in the 2 years since Sept 11.   For 
example, after a series of attacks in the spring of 2002, Israel launched one of its most 
extensive forays into the Occupied Territories in years.341  The incursion involved 
significant casualties on both sides, and included a siege on the headquarters of 
Palestinian Authority President Yasir Arafat.342  The incursions also involved a 
significant attack on a Palestinian refugee camp in Jenin, which was surrounded by 
rumors of a massacre of up to 500 Palestinian civilians there.343  Ultimately, a United 
Nations investigation found that there had in fact been no “massacre” – total casualties 
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numbered 52, with civilian casualties of about 14-20.344  Additionally, in spring 2003 
after a series of terrorist acts, Israel launched air strikes against terrorist camps in Syria –
the first time Israel forces had attacked Syria in 30 years.345  Israel has also continued a 
policy of pre-emptive military strikes on the Occupied Territories in order to thwart 
potential terrorist attacks.346 Finally, as an extension of its security state apparatus, in 
recent months, the Israeli government finalized plans for a “security fence” to protect 
Israeli against terrorist attacks.347  While the Israeli government has argued that the fence 
would keep out terrorists, the fence has been criticized as being a significant infringement 
on Palestinian liberty and economic well-being.348  In addition, rather than respecting pre-
1967 borders, the fence expropriates large tracts of Arab land in the Occupied Territories 
in order to fence in Jewish settlements there.349 In sum, while September 11 did not 
change Israeli policy, a lack of pressure, combined with distractions due to the American 
invasion of Iraq in the spring of 2003, have allowed the Israeli government to escalate its 
responses to terrorist attacks against Israel.
C.  India
Although receiving less media attention in the United States than anti-American 
and anti-Israeli terrorism, anti-Indian terrorism is one of the most significant threats in the 
world today.  With over one-hundred thousand casualties, terrorism taken more lives in 
India than any other country.350  This threat exacerbates the seemingly intractable 
tensions between India and Pakistan, which have fought three wars since the countries 
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obtained independence in 1947.  The Indian government has repeatedly asserted that anti-
Indian terrorism has both covertly and overtly supported by Pakistan.351 As in the case of 
Israel and Palestine, therefore, terrorist attacks against India have repeatedly subverted 
the Indo-Pak peace process.352  With the presence of nuclear weapons in both India and 
Pakistan, there is a significant threat that terrorist attacks in India may escalate conflict 
between India and Pakistan, leading to the possibility of nuclear war on the Indian sub-
continent (a situation which occurred in late 2001 after terrorists bombed the Indian 
parliament).353  It is for this reason that President Clinton once remarked that South Asia 
is “the most dangerous place on Earth.”354 An additional consideration when thinking 
about terrorism in India is its relationship to broader tensions Indian society.  Unlike the 
predominantly external threat of terrorism in the United States and Israel, terrorism in 
India is generally related to separatist movements resulting from the significant ethnic 
and religious cleavages within Indian society.  These movements, India argues, is in 
tension with the secular essence of Indian society.355 As a result, the threat of terrorism is 
more than a threat to human life – it is seen as a threat to the very core of the Indian 
identity.
History
The major threat of terrorism in India today is terrorism within and related to the 
disputed states of Kashmir and Jammu, discussed below.  In addition, I will be discussing 
terrorist activity related to separatist movements in the state of Punjab in the 1980s.  
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While this movement is no longer a significant threat in India, it was the impetus for
some of the anti-terrorist legislation discussed.  The Punjabi case also provides a useful
point of comparison to current Indian policy.356
Terrorism in Punjab is related to separatist intentions of Sikhs in Punjab.  Upon 
independence from Great Britain, India was partitioned into the majority Hindu state of 
India and the majority Muslim state of Pakistan (East and West, with East Pakistan 
becoming Bangladesh in 1971).  Smaller religious groups, including the Sikhs, were not 
considered in this partition.357  As result, partition resulted in approximately 2.5 million 
Sikhs being displaced from their homes in West Punjab (today part of Pakistan).358  The 
Indian constitution was also a cause of significant grievances in the Sikh community 
because it defined Sikhism as part of the Hindu religion.359  This clause was viewed as a 
threat to the separate Sikh identity.360  In addition, the Indian central government was 
seen as placing significant economic burdens on Sikhs, which included the expropriation 
of land, the diversion of water, and a reduction in government investment in Punjab.361
After the dismissal of the government of Punjab in 1980, in which the Sikh party Akali 
Dal held a majority, the movement turned to terrorism.362 In 1984, following series of 
escalating steps, including Akali Dal’s preventing the shipping of Punjabi wheat and 
withholding taxes to the central government, India deployed 100,000 troops in Punjab.363
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In addition, in June, 1984, the Indian government launched Operation Blue Star a large 
scale assault against alleged terrorists in Punjab, and included an attack on the Golden 
Temple complex (a Sikh religious site), which the Indian government alleged was being 
used as the headquarters for the terrorist movement. 364  In response, in October, 1984 
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was killed by her Sikh bodyguard.365
Following the death of Indira Gandhi, attempts were made at a political solution 
to the problems in Punjab.  On July 25, 1985 a peace accord was signed by Indian Prime 
Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Akali Dal president Harchand Singh.366  However, after the 
Akali Dal came to power as a result of statewide elections, the central government once 
again dismissed the state government in 1987.367  More violence followed, and the Indian 
government responded with a second assault on the Golden Temple complex in 1988.  
This latter assault, named Operation Black Thunder, was far more successful, however, 
and resulted in no civilian deaths.368  Nevertheless, terrorist attacks continued into their 
worst phase after Black Thunder, with nearly 10,000 persons killed from 1988 to 1992.369
In 1992, the Indian government revived the political process and held statewide elections.  
This resulted in a significant decline in terrorist activity, which ended for the most part by 
1995.370
The rise and decline of terrorism related to Sikh separatism stands in stark 
contrast to terrorism related to Jammu and Kashmir.  The region, which has significant 
strategic and symbolic value, has been the source of seemingly endless hostilities 
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between India and Pakistan, both of which claim the territory.371  The dispute was caused 
by the undecided fate of Jammu and Kashmir at the time of partition.  While the Hindu 
states of India were partitioned into secular India, the predominantly Muslim portion of 
the country was carved into the Islamic state of Pakistan.  However, the status of 562
princely states was left undecided.  These included Jammu and Kashmir, which had a 
predominantly Muslim population, but a Hindu prince, Maharajah Hari Singh.372 Several 
states had Muslim rulers and Hindu majorities as well, but the accession of these states, 
indeed most states, to either India or Pakistan was uncontroversial due to territorial 
contiguity.  Kashmir, however, shared borders with both India and Pakistan, though its 
ties to Pakistan were arguably stronger.373 Before the final disposition of the state could 
be decided, violence broke out when Pakistani militants launched an incursion into
western Kashmir in October 1947.  In an exchange that evidently foreshadowed the 
language of the conflict decades later, the government of Kashmir protested, arguing that 
Pakistan was supporting the militants, while Pakistan denied support, arguing that the 
militants were responding to atrocities perpetrated against the Muslim population in 
Kashmir.374  Maharajah Singh sought the assistance of India in resisting the invasion, and 
in return, assented to Indian annexation of the territory.375
Since 1947, the status of Jammu and Kashmir has been contested by both parties.  
India and Pakistan have fought three wars over Kashmir during that time, the most recent 
of which occurred in 1999 after Pakistan launched an incursion into the Kargil region of 
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the territory.376  In addition, since the late 1980s, Kashmiri terrorist groups have 
committed almost continuous acts of violence against Indian targets.  According to the 
Indian Ministry of Home Affairs, from 1989 to 1999 terrorist incidents and Jammu and 
Kashmir averaged over 3700 incidents per year, and resulting in an average of over 2100 
deaths per year.377  Significant incidents during this time included the kidnapping of the 
daughter of the Indian Home Minister in December 1989,378 the kidnapping of Indian Oil 
Company executive K. Doraiswamy in 1991,379 and the burning down of a Sufi Shrine in 
Srinigar in December 1995.380  In 1996, parliamentary elections were revived in Kashmir, 
and again in 1998 and 1999.  The elections corresponded with some decrease in violence, 
though the number of terrorist incidents remains high.381
Legislation
With ethnic and social cleavages imposing strong pressures on the state, it is 
unsurprising that the India has established a complicated legislative and constitutional 
framework for dealing with terrorism.  Prior to the recent Prevention of Terrorism Act, 
enacted in 2002 (discussed later), the most significant anti-terrorism legislation enacted 
by the Indian parliament was the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act .  
An additional consideration for understanding the Indian response to terrorism is its 
preventative detention legislation, most notably the National Security Act of 1980.  The 
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Indian design is draconian in comparison to the American, and reflects the fear of 
separatism and communal pressures which are at the heart of the Indian state identity.382
In 1987, in response to the situation in Punjab, the Indian parliament passed the 
Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act.383  TADA is similar to other 
counterterrorism laws in providing for definitions and punishments for various terrorism 
related activities.  First, TADA elaborately defines a terrorist act to include various 
threats to life and property which is intended “strike terror in the people or any section of 
the people or to alienate any section of the people or to adversely affect harmony 
amongst different sections of the people.”384  Interestingly, in addition to acts intended to 
strike fear, the TADA definition of terrorist act also included acts intended to “overawe 
the Government.”385  For both types of acts, TADA provides for capital punishment in 
the act results in death, or up to life imprison for other acts.  TADA also criminalizes 
conspiracies and attempts to commit terrorist acts,386 as well as harboring or concealing a 
terrorist,387 or possessing property derived from terrorist acts.388
In addition to these basic provisions, TADA also contained various proscriptions 
which went beyond its counterparts in the United States.  For example, in addition to 
proscribing harboring or concealing terrorists, TADA also criminalized advocating or 
abetting terrorist acts,389 the latter of which includes the mere communication or 
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association with terrorists.390  In addition, TADA proscribed membership in terrorist 
groups.  Finally, TADA also proscribed various “disruptive activities,” which included 
not only acts that disrupt the sovereignty or territorial integrity of India, but also acts 
which “question” such sovereignty or territorial integrity, or “support any claim…directly 
or indirectly…for the cession of and part of India, or secession of any part of India from 
the Union.”391  Any of these advocacy crimes were punishable by up to life imprisonment
TADA also provided for the creation of “Designated Courts” which had exclusive 
jurisdiction to try violations of its provisions.392  These courts were closed to the 
public,393 and provided significantly diminished procedural protections for suspected 
terrorists.  For example, where the potential punishment was not more than three years, 
the court was authorized to conduct a “summary trial,” though it was free to recall 
witnesses or rehear a case where circumstances warranted.394  In addition, TADA 
provided reduced evidentiary burdens in the Designated Courts, for example, for 
confessions395 and eyewitnesses identifications.396  Finally, TADA created a presumption 
of guilt in situations where arms or explosives found in the possession of the accused 
were similar to those used in the act, or the accused’s fingerprints were found at the scene 
or on arms or vehicles used in the act, or where the accused rendered “any financial 
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assistance to a person accused of or reasonably suspected of [a terrorist act](emphasis 
added).”397
TADA did create some protections for the accused, including Miranda type 
protections for confessions,398 and the right to appeal.399  But despite these nominal 
protections, TADA was prone to substantial abuse by the Indian government, often being 
applied in areas not afflicted by terrorism.400  Faced with substantial criticism, the Indian 
government allowed TADA to expire in 1995.401
In addition to laws such as TADA, the Indian constitution authorizes the central 
government to provide for preven tative detention in matters related to foreign affairs, 
defense, or security.402  Unlike in the United States, the Indian preventative detention 
provisions could be employed without criminal charge.403  Since independence, the 
Indian parliament has enacted several statutes authorizing preventative detention, the 
most recent of which is the National Security Act of 1980 (hereinafter “NSA”).404  Under 
the NSA, the Indian Central government, or any State government, may order the 
detention of an individual in order to prevent him or her from acting in a manner 
“prejudicial to the [defense] of India, the relations of India with foreign powers, or the 
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security of India.”405  The statute requires detention orders to meet with the same 
procedural requirements as a warrant under the ordinary criminal procedure code.406  The 
statute sets a maximum detention period of 12 months.407 Under the NSA, some 
procedural protections exist for accused persons, though they are ultimately ineffective 
safeguards. The detaining authority is required to inform the detainee of the cause for the 
detention,408 and of his or her rights under the constitution.409 In addition, within three 
weeks of the date of detention, the detention must be reported to an advisory board410
which is to rule as to whether there is sufficient cause to justify the detention.411
However proceedings before the advisory board are informal, with no formal findings or 
rules of evidence, and the accused has no right to counsel or of confrontation.412  More 
generally, judicial deference to executive authorities as to the existence of security risks 
substantially curtails protections for detainees under the NSA.413
Executive Action
Beyond these legislative measures, India’s counterterrorist policies have tended to 
be dominated by its military and paramilitary apparatus.  The belief that Pakistan has 
both covertly and overtly supported anti-Indian terrorism most likely form part of the 
explanation for this.  In addition, India’s constitutional structure, like the United States, 
divides sovereign authority between the State and Central governments.  Law and order 
405
 NSA §§3(1)-(2). 
406
 NSA §4.
407
 NSA §13.
408
 Jinks, supra note 402 at 336.
409
 Id. at 337.
410
 NSA §10
411
 NSA §11
412
 Jinks, supra note 402 at 335-36.
413 See id. at 329.
has traditionally been a State issue.414  As a result, the Indian central government has 
treated terrorism first treated as a law and order problem to be dealt with by State 
governments, and then, upon deterioration, escalated the conflict by responding with 
military and paramilitary forces.415
The Indian government’s drastic measures in Punjab illustrate this approach well.  
In response to the increasing militant violence in Punjab, the Indian Central government 
took control of the State in imposed direct rule on the State in 1984.416  In addition, in 
June 1984, the Indian government launched the infamous “Operation BlueStar”, a wide 
spread assault on Punjabi militants.  The centerpiece of the Operation was an assault on 
the Golden Temple Complex at Amritsar.  The Indian government had alleged that the 
Golden Temple was being used as a headquarters for Punjabi militants.417  The operation 
also included assaults on 41 other sites, and involved the use of 70,000 troops, the 
expulsion of foreign journalists, and the imposition of a statewide curfew.418  In the end, 
the government reported the death of 493 terrorists and 83 army personnel, although 
eyewitnesses reported between 4000 and 8000 persons killed.419  In addition, over 6000 
persons were detained following the assault, and several thousand more were arrested in 
operations throughout Punjab in subsequent months.420
In subsequent years, significant abuses by Indian security forces continued.  A 
1994 Human Rights Watch report noted that security forces had engaged in summary 
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executions, and had been issued shoot-to-kill orders.421  In addition, security forces had 
conducted mass round-ups and warrantless house-to-house searches for suspected 
militants.422  The use of torture was also condoned by Indian officials, both as a means of 
extracting information, and as a form of reprisal. For example, after one attack on 
security forces, 200 persons were detained and tortured near Kathunangal.423  Finally, 
“forced disappearances” had been widespread in Punjab.424  In general, these policies 
were not only tolerated, but encouraged by government officials in India.425  Since 1992, 
the separatist violence has been in significant decline, which may believe is the result of 
the resumption of political processes and state elections in Punjab.426  Others, however, 
have noted continued impunity for human rights abuses there.427
In Kashmir, the response of the Indian government has been even more severe.  
Just as in the case of Punjab, following the onset of separatist violence, the Indian 
government imposed direct rule on Kashmir in January 1990.428  This was followed by a 
steady escalation of the conflict between security forces and militants.  In January 1993, 
for example, nearly forty civilians were massacred near Sopore by Indian Border Security 
forces.429 In addition, beginning in 1995, the Indian government began arming and 
training local auxiliaries to supplement security forces.430  Regarding these paramilitary 
units, a 1996 India Today article noted, “[They have become the] centerpiece of the 
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counterinsurgency operations in the Valley ... Used initially as intelligence sources—to 
help in flushing-out operations—they are now also being used as "prowlers": they take 
part in the security forces' armed encounters with militants...”431  By 1999, nearly 
400,000 security personnel were deployed by the Indian government in Kashmir.432
Both military and paramilitary forces have been responsible for gross human 
rights violations in Jammu and Kashmir.  As in the case of Punjab, these have included 
extra-judicial executions, forced disappearances, and torture.433  Security legislation for 
the area authorizes shoot-to-kill orders and the destruction of property.434  In addition, 
there is a widespread incidence of rape of local women at the hands of Indian security 
forces and paramilitary groups.435  Attacks against human rights workers and journalists 
have also been documented.436  As in the case of Punjab, security forces and paramilitary 
personnel act with impunity in the region.437
Recent Developments
On October 24, 2001, just 6 weeks after the September 11 attacks, the Indian 
government issued the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance (POTO).  Then, on March 27, 
2002, the Indian parliament gave the ordinance permanent effect by passing the highly 
controversial Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 (POTA) to replace the lapsed TADA.438
Counter intuitively given the timing of its passage, POTA was significantly less drastic 
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than TADA, perhaps reflecting the deep seated criticism that TADA faced when it was 
existence.  POTA’s basic provisions were similar to TADA in the definitions of terrorist 
acts, the criminalization of support for terrorism, and the proscription of the proceeds of 
terrorist acts.439  The act also provides for the seizure of property connected to terrorist 
activity,440 and requires disclosure to government authorities of financial transactions.441
Like TADA, POTA establishes Special courts with exclusive jurisdiction to try 
terrorist offenses and supplemental jurisdiction to try other offenses.442  Like the Courts 
under TADA, the POTA Courts have the authority to try certain offenses in a summary 
fashion if the punishment does not exceed three years.443  The requirements for 
confessions are similar to those in TADA.444  POTA also places similar presumptions of 
guilt as under TADA.445  Finally, POTA places gives some protections to the accused, 
notably by allowing them to consult with counsel.446  Family must also be notified 
whenever someone is arrested under the Act.447
POTA departs from TADA in establishing a procedure for the declaration of 
terrorist organizations under the Act.  Membership in such organization is criminalized, 
as is providing support to such organizations.  The Act also establishes a procedure for 
organizations wishing to challenge their status as terrorist organizations.448  In addition, 
POTA is substantially different from TADA in allowing for interception of electronic 
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communications.  Like the Patriot Act, POTA is designed expand the investigatory 
powers of the state to take into account changing technology.  POTA requires 
investigators to apply to a Competent Authority, rather than a judicial officer, for a 
warrant to intercept electronic communications if there is reason to believe a terrorist act 
will occur.449
The dominant criticism of POTA is that, like TADA, it can be used to arrest 
political opposition not engaged in terrorist acts.  For example, the definition of terrorist 
act includes intents not only to threaten the security, but also the “unity” of India, and 
incorporates not only acts of violence but “any other means” which “disrupt services.”450
In other words, POTA, if the government so chooses, could be interpreted to proscribe 
acts of civil disobedience such as labor strikes.  A Human Rights Watch Report issued in 
March 2003 noted that POTA had in fact been used against political opponents and 
religious minorities.451  This has included the arrest of leaders of various political parties 
not only in Kashmir, but in the states of Tamil Nadu, and Uttar Pradesh.
Beyond legislative avenues, September 11 arguably escalated the scope of India’s 
counterterrorist efforts.  The relationship between the September 11 attacks and Indian 
counterterrorism efforts is complicated.  At one level, many have long argued that anti-
Indian terrorism, especially as related to Kashmir, was part of a broader Islamic militant 
movement which conducting attacks against the United States.452  The fact that many 
Kashmiri militants were supported by Pakistan and were trained in Afghanistan seemed 
to lend credibility to this argument.  Beyond this, the political milieu of South Asia was 
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drastically changed post-9/11.  The United States invasion of Afghanistan in response to 
the attacks was executed with the support of the Pakistani government, angering 
Pakistani hardliners.  Pakistan currently continues to support U.S. counterterrorist efforts, 
for example, in assisting in the capture of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.453 To extent that 
that the government of Pakistan needs their support, it is safe to assume that an escalation 
of the Kashmir conflict would be necessary to appease these hardliners.  If Pakistan, or 
elements of the Pakistani government, supports anti-Indian terrorism, as the Indian 
government claims, there would be an increase in terrorism, and countermeasures by the 
Indian government as a response to the American “war on terror,” and now, perhaps, the 
American invasion of Iraq.
Although perhaps not appropriately described as an escalation, in the year after 
those attacks, two episodes demonstrated India’s approach to counterterrorism in the 
post-9/11 world.  First, on December 13, 2001, terrorists allegedly trained by Pakistan 
attacked the Indian parliament. India blamed Pakistan, and in the weeks that followed, 
tensions between the two escalated as the world feared a possible nuclear exchange.  
Crisis was averted when Pakistan arrested leaders and followers of Lashkar-e-Taiba and 
Jaish-e-Muhammad, two groups India blamed for the attacks.454  Just a few months later, 
however, this scenario was repeated when militants in Kashmir attacked an Indian soldier 
and his family on May 14th, and then an Indian police station on May 30.455 While it is 
arguably absurd to risk nuclear because of terrorist attacks, both episodes reflect the 
reality of Indian counterterrorist efforts – India sees Kashmir related terrorism as war by 
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proxy.  It responds in kind.  At the very least, terrorism has continued to prevent 
meaningful negotiations for peace because, like Israel, India continues to argue that 
negotiations will not occur until acts of violence stop.
IV.  Conclusion
After examining counterterrorism in the United States, Israel, and India, we can 
attempt to classify each country’s policies into one of the three models discussed earlier, 
the criminal justice model, the intelligence model, and the war model.  As discussed 
earlier, each country’s policies will be categorized using three variables of analysis which 
reflect important civil liberties and democratic values: collectivity, accountability, and 
timing.  Under the criminal justice model, punishment is exacted in a manner which is 
most consistent with democratic values; it is open, reactive, and individualized.  The 
intelligence model is individualized, secretive and tends to applied preventatively.  
Finally, the war model is applied collectively, and tends to be applied preventatively and 
in secret, though the more collectively it is applied, the less secretive the action taken can 
be.  Using the variables discussed, it is clear that each of these countries is currently 
committed to a war model of counterterrorism.  Such a model is problematic, not only 
because of the civil liberties and human rights implications of the model, but also because 
the approach has been combined with an unwillingness of each government to address 
the underlying causes of terrorism. 
The United State’s commitment to the war model is of course demonstrated by its 
execution of the “war on terrorism.”  First, the United States has engaged in several 
policies which indicate a willingness to take a collectivist approach towards 
counterterrorism rather than and individualized one.  Domestically, using material 
witness warrants and immigration laws, the U.S. government has detained over 1200 
hundred persons who have not committed acts of terrorism.  In addition, in early 2004, 
the U.S. government began program to photograph and fingerprint all persons entering 
the country.456 While the merits and civil liberties implications this program are 
debatable, it is clear that government is continuing the expand the reach of its 
counterterrorist efforts.  The program is also a paradigmatic example of the “security” 
model, which is the domestic counterpart of the war model.  Internationally, this 
collectivist approach is demonstrated by the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq that the U.S. 
fought in the two years after the September 11 attacks as part of its war on terrorism.  
These wars, as well as the Bush administrations classification of the “axis of evil,” and 
pressures placed on Syria and Iran since September 11, demonstrate a more general 
willingness to hold states responsible for terrorist attacks.  As in the domestic examples, 
these policies reflect a collectivist approach of the U.S. government, which is willing to 
take action against large classes of persons in order to reach the smaller class of terrorists.  
Second, the U.S. government has moved away from a reactive model and towards a 
preventative model of counterterrorism. Domestically, the detention of persons suspected 
of having ties to terrorism, rather than merely those who are suspected of committing 
terrorist acts, is a quintessential preventive act.  In addition, the USA-Patriot Act 
expanded the surveillance powers of the government to allow it to use FISA to obtain 
warrants for pen registers and trap and trace devices (including the ability to monitor e-
mail), as well as to obtain roving wiretaps.  Like detentions, these efforts reflect an 
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increased emphasis on preventing attacks rather than punishing those guilty of 
committing acts.  Internationally, the Bush Administration has engaged targeted 
assassinations at the individual level, and preemptive strikes at the collective level, as in 
the case of Iraq.  All of these indicate a move away from reactive efforts towards a 
preemptive model of counterterrorism.  Finally, U.S. policy is becoming increasingly less 
transparent and accountable.  For example, as discussed, USA-Patriot expanded the use 
of the secret FISA court to obtain warrants in counterterrorist efforts.  In addition, the 
U.S. government has indicated a decreased willingness to use an open criminal justice 
system for those it accuses of terrorist acts.  Rather, as in the cases of Yasser Hamdi, Jose 
Padilla, and Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, the government has opted for secret military 
tribunals, and it has indicated its willingness to do so in the case of Zacarias Moussaoui.  
In cases such as Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, and those captured in Afghanistan, it has 
avoided criminal charges entirely.  In sum, the current U.S. policy, with its increasing 
secrecy, and its emphasis on collective prevention, has unabashedly moved towards a war 
model of counterterrorism.
Israeli policy also clearly tracks the war model under the relevant variables.  First, 
Israel’s collectivist approach is demonstrated by various policies, including target 
hardening and lock-down mechanisms, security screenings in public places, limitations 
on the freedom of movement, and the development of the so called security fence in the 
Occupied Territories.  In addition, in the Occupied Territories, Israeli military action in 
the Occupied Territories, (such as those that were undertaken in the spring of 2002), and 
statutes such as those allowing for the demolition of homes in reflect similar collectivist 
tendencies in Israeli policy.  Israeli military action against Jordan, Lebanon, and most 
recently against Syria, reflect similar tendencies. Second, Israeli policy has tended to be 
less transparent and accountable.  Primary domestic counterterrorism responsibility falls 
on one of its three intelligence services, the General Security Services, the Israeli Defense 
Forces Intelligence Branch, and the Mossad.  These agencies have resorted to torture in 
order to obtain information, and have generally been subject to less oversight than their 
American counterparts.  Moreover, like the United States, Israel has tended to rely on 
military tribunals rather than open courts in cases of terrorism (at least in the case of 
Palestinians in the Occupied Territories.  Finally, like current U.S. policy, the Israeli 
policies such as preventative detention and target assassinations reflect an increased 
emphasis on preventative action rather than the reactive enforcement of the criminal 
justice model.
India, perhaps more than any of the other the countries in this study, has 
consistently followed a war model of counterterrorism.  First, with respect to collectivity, 
in both Punjab and Kashmir, India deployed massive numbers of troops in order to 
counter insurgencies there.  In Punjab, the infamous Operation Blue Star involved not 
only the deployment of large numbers of troops, but the killing and detention of vast 
numbers of persons.  While not on the same scale, similar widespread searches and 
roundups of militants continued for years afterwards.  In Kashmir, the Indian army or its 
surrogates have engaged in widespread retaliation against civilians.  In addition, India 
continues to hold Pakistan responsible for Kashmir related terrorism.  India, therefore, 
like the U.S. and Israel, does not treat terrorism as the act of individuals, but rather a 
justification for action against large population groups.  Second, India’s use of secret 
tribunals in the case of terrorism, like in the U.S. and Israel, increases the secrecy of 
Indian counterterrorist policies.  This combined with the massive human rights violations, 
including torture, rape, and extrajudicial killings, reflect the minimal accountability and 
transparency in Indian counterterrorism.  Finally, Indian preventative detention laws 
reflect a strong willingness to employ preventative rather than reactive measures in 
punishing terrorism.  In sum, India, like Israel, and the United States since September 11, 
has resorted to large scale collective actions in order to repel counterterrorist efforts.  
This, combined with its aggressive use of preventative detention laws and secret 
tribunals, place India squarely within the war model of counterterrorism.
That the “war” language has been adopted by U.S. and other countries since 
September 11 should come as no surprise.  But the language of war could simply be a 
rhetorical device, or a means of rallying national efforts towards a common objective, as 
in the case of a “war” on poverty.  Applying the variables of collectivity, accountability 
and timing, however, it becomes clear that the “war on terror” is not simply a rhetoric, it 
is move away from open and individualized justice, towards secretive government which 
employs group punishment.  This has significant civil liberties and human rights 
implications.  By being employed against large groups rather than individuals, and in a 
preventative rather than reactive way, the war model essentially exacts punishment 
against innocent parties.  In other words, the war model takes actions against large groups 
because it is more efficient than expending resources toward directing punishment with 
precision.  Innocent parties become the “collateral damage” in a war on terror.  
Moreover, the political expediency of the war model and its collateral damage is 
disturbing – rather than simply being more efficient, the war model may in fact be a form 
of displaced anger.  Victims of human rights abuses in Kashmir, for example, noted that 
the Indian army (or their surrogates) engages in human rights abuses against the local 
population when it is unable to locate terrorist suspects.457  This presents an interesting 
parallel to the United States’ invasion of Iraq in the spring of 2003.  Even if it was indeed 
part of the “war on terror”, the invasion of Iraq was arguably also simply a result of the 
Bush Administration’s inability to catch top al-Qaeda operatives such as Usama bin 
Laden. The response of the Indian army and the U.S. government is the same – the scale 
is only larger because the scope of the conflict is larger. 
In addition, the rhetorical usefulness of the war terminology diverts attention from 
the severe problems associated with the war model.  As Heymann notes, war requires a 
massive reallocation of resources, and is coupled with an understanding of tremendous 
costs to be borne, among them limitations on civil rights.458 The increased accountability 
which results from the scale of the war model is therefore undercut by the willingness of 
the public to defer to the State in time of war.  The countervailing principle which 
justifies such costs is the determination of exigency and the limited time frame of the 
conflict.  However, the pre-conditions of terrorism, in contrast to the pre-conditions 
paradigmatic war, are neither exigent nor temporary.459  In India for example, the 
National Security Act, authorizing preventative detentions, was justified on the grounds 
that:
“The anti-social and anti- national elements including secessionist communal and 
pro-caste elements and also other elements who adversely influence and affect the 
services essential to the community pose a grave challenge to the lawful authority 
and sometimes even hold the society to ransom.”460
457 Behind the Kashmir Conflict, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (July 1999).
458
 Heymann, supra note 24 at 20.
459 Id .at 21.
460
 Jinks, supra note 402 at 339.
However, these conditions do not reflect extenuating circumstances calling for extreme 
measures, they are the description of India’s long-term political condition.461  Similarly, 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the American “war on terror” are the result of long term 
conditions in the Middle East and other parts of the Islamic world.  In short, “‘war’  is 
neither a persuasive description of the situation we face nor an adequate statement of our 
objectives.”462
Indeed, an analysis of these long term conditions is precisely what is missing from 
each of the models discussed in this study.  As discussed earlier, the criminal justice, 
intelligence, and war models are “repressive” models which seek to prevent terrorism 
through ex ante or ex post deterrence.  An alternative approach would be to employ 
“conciliatory” models which call for negotiation with terrorists or reform in order to end 
violence.  By addressing the “root causes” of terrorism, conciliation decreases the 
incentives of actors to engage in terrorism.  In India for example, after political reforms 
were instituted in Punjab, deaths from terrorism declined from 2,586 in 1991, to sixty-
eight from 1993-98.463  Similar declines were seen in anti-Israeli terrorism during the 
implementation of the Oslo Accords, during which time the Israeli Defence Ministry 
reported a greater than 90% decline in the terrorism in Israel and the Occupied 
Territories.464
Unfortunately, the pattern in the West over the past few decades has been to pay 
less and less attention to the root causes of terrorism, such as oppressive conditions and 
poverty. Examining root causes has been viewed by some as “appeasement” of 
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terrorism.  Moreover, some have argued that looking at root causes of terrorism is 
inappropriate because the “the vast majority” of the world’s repressed and poor people do 
not resort to terrorism.465  Such analyses lead to faulty policy.  First, even though not all 
persons in oppressive and impoverished conditions resort to terrorism, it does not follow 
that improving conditions would need lead to a decline in terrorism.  Moreover, it is also 
true that not all persons who live in poverty or lack opportunity, resort to conventional 
criminal activity.  But it is readily apparent that we can reduce criminal activity by 
improving economic conditions and opportunity for persons living in poverty.  Such an 
argument would never be construed as “appeasing” criminals or providing incentive for 
criminal activity.  Nor would it be attacked as unpatriotic.
Second, a stated policy of non-negotiation or non-reform effectively allows 
terrorists to control policy.  Assume, for example, the Israeli government states a policy 
of not negotiating with the Palestinian Authority (PA) until anti-Israeli terrorism stops.
This position allows terrorist groups to exploit conditions to their best advantage.  If they 
want negotiations to occur, they can cease terrorist acts; if they want negotiations to fail, 
they can engage in more terrorism.  A policy of “we will not negotiate with terrorists” in 
order to prevent “rewarding” terrorists, assumes that negotiations are what the terrorist 
group wants.  But as many have noted, terrorists often engage violence in order to 
prevent negotiation and encourage repressive policies which turn people against the 
target state.466  In other words, adopting a repressive “war” model may be giving 
terrorists exactly what they want.  Governments should not condition the examination of 
root causes on the end of terrorism, they should look at root causes in spite of terror in 
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order to end the violence.  Such a position puts governments in control of policy, rather 
than terrorists.
Indeed, of the countries in this study, the U.S. government should be the most 
inclined to examine the root causes of terrorism, rather employing the war mentality is 
has adopted to combat terrorism. As many have noted, while terrorists engage in anti-
American violence for a variety of reasons, there is a seemingly endless supply of recruits 
to anti-American causes due to a variety of U.S. policies.  These have included 1) support 
for repressive regimes in Middle East, including Saudi Arabia, 2) unconditional U.S. 
support for Israel, and 3) indifference to the plight of Muslims in Chechnya, Kashmir, 
and the Balkans.  The war on terrorism, including the invasion of Iraq in spring 2003, has 
given more ammunition to the anti-American cause.  Unlike in the cases of Israel and 
India, for whom reconciliation would require “giving something up” in terms of land, the 
U.S. does not have to give anything up in order to examine its policies.  The change 
required of the U.S. by conciliation is simply what the U.S. should have been doing all 
along: examining the consequences of its foreign policy on innocent populations. 
Unfortunately, in the 2 years since the September 11 attacks, the U.S has adopted a 
position that addressing underlying concerns is incompatible with maintaining strength in 
the “war on terror.”
This paper has not been an attempt to develop a set of “best practices” for 
counterterrorism.  I have attempted to compare counterterrorist strategies in the United 
States, Israel, and India through the lens of three models.  The criminal justice model 
treats terrorism as essentially a criminal justice problem.  It relies on the criminal 
processes and punishment in order to deter terrorist activity.  In contrast, the intelligence 
model treats terrorism as a security problem.  It seeks to prevent terrorism as through 
direct prevention rather than punishment.  But while its lack of procedural safeguards 
aids in the prevention of terrorism, they also raise significant civil liberties concerns.  
Finally, like the intelligence model, the war model treats terrorism as a security problem.  
But unlike the intelligence model, counterterrorism is achieved through action against 
large groups of people in order to achieve either prevention or punishment.  The key 
feature of the war model is that by acting against groups, application of the war model 
allows governments to avoid the both the procedural safeguards of the criminal justice 
model and costs of precision associated with the intelligence model.  But both of these 
characteristics raise substantial civil liberties and human rights concerns.  Both terrorists 
and innocents face punishment without procedural safeguards.  Through the axes of 
analysis developed in this paper – collectivity, accountability, and timing – it is clear that 
all three countries have adopted a war model of counterterrorism.  In the United States, 
this approach has worked in conjunction with an unwillingness to address the underlying 
causes of terrorism.  But regardless of the moral implications of terrorism, an 
unwillingness to deal with root causes simply leads to bad policy.  Thus, while the merits 
of the approaches of each country will continue to be debated, their costs cannot be 
ignored.  Of course, no one approach is adequate, but terrorism has and will be a long 
term political problem – it stands to reason that it will require long term political 
solutions.
